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During social interactions, people’s eyes convey a wealth of information about their direction of attention
and their emotional and mental states. This review aims to provide a comprehensive overview of past and
current research into the perception of gaze behavior and its effect on the observer. This encompasses the
perception of gaze direction and its influence on perception of the other person, as well as gaze-following
behavior such as joint attention, in infant, adult, and clinical populations. Particular focus is given to the
gaze-cueing paradigm that has been used to investigate the mechanisms of joint attention. The contri-
bution of this paradigm has been significant and will likely continue to advance knowledge across diverse
fields within psychology and neuroscience.
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The “language of the eyes” is a rich and varied vocabulary. The
eyes and their highly expressive surrounding region can commu-
nicate complex mental states such as emotions, beliefs, and de-
sires. This review is inspired by one aspect of gaze perception: the
use of perceived gaze direction to shift visual attention, that is, the
seemingly automatic propensity to orient to the same object that
other people are looking at. This joint attention has been studied in
infants for decades (e.g., Farroni, Massaccesi, Pividori, & Johnson,
2004; Scaife & Bruner, 1975). Recently, interest has been engaged
in describing the mechanisms of attention underlying this feature
of social interaction in adults as well as infants. In doing so, visual
attention, a classic area of cognitive research, has been reinvigo-
rated with the use of ecologically valid stimuli (i.e., eyes). Equally,
research into joint attention has benefited from the use of cognitive
spatial cueing paradigms. The fusion of these two domains has
allowed perhaps one of the most interesting fields of research in
social cognition to emerge. This review will focus on the contri-
bution of gaze-cueing research to our knowledge about social
cognition and attention as well as the complex processes that allow
these mechanisms to interact so dynamically.
Although the primary focus of this review is the effect of
perceived gaze direction on attention, we also aim to give an
overview of the gaze perception abilities of humans and to look at
the effects that averted gaze and gaze contact can have on people’s
perception of the individuals they interact with. We note that, with
regard to these issues, models such as Perrett’s description of how
gaze, head, and body position cues are integrated in the neural
responses of superior temporal sulcus (STS; Perrett, Hietanen,
Oram, & Benson, 1992) and Baron-Cohen’s idea that some aspects
of gaze perception are performed by innate modules (an Eye
Direction Detector; Baron-Cohen, 1995) have been reviewed more
extensively elsewhere (e.g., Emery, 2000; Langton, Watt, &
Bruce, 2000), as has the development of joint attention and its
neural basis (e.g., Allison, Puce, & McCarthy, 2000; Moore &
Dunham, 1995). Our discussion of these issues is intended to
provide a context in which we can then place the new evidence
from gaze-cueing studies. We aim to address the following issues
in recent and ongoing research into gaze cueing: What can gaze
cueing tell us about the mechanisms of visual attention? What can
gaze cueing of attention tell us about social interactions? What can
the attention literature on gaze cueing say about the processing of
gaze in development and in clinical populations? What can gaze
cueing reveal about the origins and neural bases of symbolic
attention cueing? Tackling these questions as well as ideas for how
this field might succeed in furthering knowledge in these areas are
the major objectives of this review.
Gaze Perception
The eyes fascinate us from the day we are born. The human
neonatal visual system, although underdeveloped, is efficient at
distinguishing these stimuli from others. The infant will come to
find that those two oval shapes can be used to gain otherwise
inaccessible information, to learn the names for objects in the
world, and to ultimately unlock the secrets of other minds. Over
the years into adulthood, the pervasive influence of the eyes and
social gaze will continue, leading to ever more elaborate skills in
engaging in collaboration, deception, and inference of intentions
and mental states. Even though the linguistically adept adult pos-
sesses many other skills to aid navigation of the social world,
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reliance on eye-gaze perception to guide and interpret social be-
havior remains a central facet of social interactions throughout life.
In this section on how gaze perception is achieved, we look at
the development of gaze perception in the infant as well as the
effect that eye contact can have on the observer and briefly discuss
the gaze perception abilities of nonhuman primates. We also
examine the mechanisms of joint attention in infants and clinical
populations. First, though, we provide an overview of the neural
basis of gaze perception, as the neural mechanisms underpinning
such behaviors as joint attention will be a recurring theme through-
out this review.
The Neural Basis of Gaze Perception
The perception of direct and averted gaze has been investigated
extensively with brain imaging techniques and electrophysiology
in humans as well as nonhuman primates. The following brief
overview of the neural substrates of gaze perception is by no
means exhaustive. It should serve as a reference frame in which to
place some neuropsychological and neuroimaging findings that
will be reported in subsequent sections of this article. More ex-
tensive reviews of the neural architecture of gaze perception can be
found elsewhere (e.g., Allison et al., 2000; Emery, 2000; Grosbras,
Laird, & Paus, 2005; Hooker et al., 2003; Jellema, Baker, Wicker,
& Perrett, 2000; Perrett et al., 1992).
A central component of the neural system for social perception
is the cortical region within and near the STS. The STS is respon-
sive to movements of the hands and body, as well as the eyes and
the mouth, and therefore is supposed to code biological motion
(Bonda, Petrides, Ostry, & Evans, 1996; Oram & Perrett, 1994;
Pelphrey, Morris, Michelich, Allison, & McCarthy, 2005; Puce,
Allison, Bentin, Gore, & McCarthy, 1998). However, this region is
also activated by static images of different postures of the face and
body. Cells in the macaque STS are sensitive to different orienta-
tions of another’s head and eyes. Although many cells are most
responsive to the combined direction of head and gaze (i.e., frontal
view of the face with eye contact or profile view with averted
gaze), others are tuned independently to body, head, and gaze
information (Perrett et al., 1990; Perrett, Smith, Potter, et al., 1985;
Wachsmuth, Oram, & Perrett, 1994). Perrett et al. (1992) sug-
gested that such view selectivity could be used to infer the direc-
tion of attention of another individual under a variety of viewing
conditions. Jellema et al. (2000) supported this idea with their
finding that the response magnitude of a subset of cells in STS that
are sensitive to reaching movements of an arm can be influenced
by the apparent direction of attention (as indicated by gaze and/or
head orientation) of the agent performing the action. They pro-
posed that this brain area, which is specialized in processing the
orientation of faces in general and eye gaze in particular, is part of
a distributed network that allows the observer to determine another
person’s intentions.
There is evidence from behavioral paradigms that humans also
have neurons that code for specific gaze directions (i.e., left vs.
right) rather than simply distinguish between direct and averted
eye gaze (R. Jenkins, Beaver, & Calder, 2006; Seyama, 2006;
Seyama & Nagayama, 2006). In an adaptation paradigm, observers
were exposed to several presentations of a particular gaze direction
(e.g., right) and then presented with a test stimulus. There was a
strong tendency to erroneously judge test stimuli with eyes that
were deviated in the adapted direction as looking straight ahead.
This is presumably because cells coding for rightward gaze be-
come habituated, with reduced responding relative to cells encod-
ing leftward gaze direction. These effects were not due to low-
level stimulus properties as they survived across changes in size
and orientation (R. Jenkins et al., 2006; Seyama & Nagayama,
2006). This observation is also reflected in dedicated neural activ-
ity responsive to left- and rightward gaze (Calder et al., 2007).
As with macaques, the human brain region that is responsive to
perceived gaze direction is the STS area, with both dynamic
(Hooker et al., 2003; Puce et al., 1998) and static face displays
(Hoffman & Haxby, 2000).1 This activation does not appear to
depend on the presence of a face per se because averted eyes
viewed in isolation are sufficient to modulate brain activity (Puce,
Smith, & Allison, 2000). In addition, the STS is more responsive
to eye movements that provide meaningful directional information
compared with other gaze shifts (e.g., cross-eyed; Hooker et al.,
2003). It is interesting to note that neural activity in response to
faces with deviated gaze is modulated depending on whether the
gaze is directed toward an object or toward empty space (Pelphrey,
Singerman, Allison, & McCarthy, 2003). This implies that gaze
processing is influenced by the perceived goal of the action and
therefore is context sensitive. Viewing faces with direct and, in
particular, averted gaze compared with those with eyes closed
activates some of the same brain areas that are involved in tasks
that require the attribution of other people’s intentions and beliefs
(Calder et al., 2002; Castelli, Frith, Happe´, & Frith, 2002). These
findings are in line with Baron-Cohen’s (1995) proposal that
encoding of another’s eye-gaze direction is an integral part of a
theory of mind.
The STS is part of a wider network for social perception that
embodies other aspects of face perception, including the process-
ing of face identity. Haxby and colleagues (Haxby, Hoffman, &
Gobbini, 2002; Haxby et al., 1999; Hoffman & Haxby, 2000)
proposed that these different functions (i.e., encoding of face
identity and of face properties that are important for social com-
munication such as gaze perception) are distinct cognitive aspects
of face perception that are also anatomically dissociable, taking
place in lateral fusiform gyrus and STS, respectively (see also
Hasselmo, Rolls, & Baylis, 1989; Kanwisher, McDermott, &
Chun, 1997; McCarthy, Puce, Gore, & Allison, 1997). For exam-
ple, when participants are instructed to attend to the identity of face
stimuli, a stronger response is evoked in the fusiform gyrus than in
STS. When the task requires attention to the direction of gaze of a
1 When drawing comparisons between monkeys and humans, one should
keep in mind that although there are striking similarities in the neural
architecture of visual processing, the inferred homology of specialized
brain areas is not necessarily straightforward (Orban, van Essen, & Van-
duffel, 2004). For example, whereas selectivity for processing faces is
predominantly found in the fusiform face area in humans, in macaques it
is more strongly confined to the STS (Tsao, Freiwald, Knutsen, Mandev-
ille, & Tootell, 2003). Nevertheless, although there are certainly differ-
ences in the anatomical organization of brain areas involved in face
processing, the functionality of the human STS region with regard to gaze
cueing is apparently very similar to its monkey counterpart; both the
human and macaque STS regions respond preferentially to eye gaze,
compared with other face-responsive brain areas (see Allison et al., 2000,
for a review).
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face, the STS region is activated more strongly than is the fusiform
gyrus (Hoffman & Haxby, 2000). This anatomical distinction
lends support to the idea that aspects of face perception that are
changeable, are communicative, and therefore require continual
on-line monitoring (e.g., emotional expression, eye gaze) are pro-
cessed in functionally separate systems to those that involve anal-
ysis of invariant features (e.g., identity and gender; Andrews &
Ewbank, 2004; Bruce & Young, 1986; Haxby et al., 2002; Hoff-
man & Haxby, 2000; but see Calder & Young, 2005, for arguments
that suggest that the issue is not by any means settled).
Further input–output connections from the STS project to the
amygdala, a structure of the limbic system that is heavily impli-
cated in the processing of the emotional content of stimuli, includ-
ing facial expressions, and in linking this information to emotional
responses in the observer (Aggleton, 1993; Aggleton, Burton, &
Passingham, 1980; Thomas et al., 2001). Lesions of the amygdala
result in deficits in judgments of both gaze direction and facial
expression (Aggleton, 1993; Young et al., 1995), suggesting that it
plays a critical role in both tasks. The role of the amygdala in gaze
monitoring has been highlighted by several recent functional neu-
roimaging studies, which showed that amygdala activity occurs in
response to passive viewing of direct and averted gaze (Wicker,
Michel, Henaff, & Decety, 1998) as well as when active detection
of eye contact versus deviated gaze is required (Kawashima et al.,
1999), even when the face holds a neutral emotional expression. A
further study by Hooker and colleagues (2003) suggested that
amygdala response to observed gaze reflects the observer’s mon-
itoring for emotional gaze events (e.g., eye contact; see also
Whalen, 1998).
The STS is also heavily connected with the parietal cortex,
which is implicated in orienting of attention (Harries & Perrett,
1991; Rafal, 1996). Specifically, there are reciprocal connections
between STS and the intraparietal sulcus (IPS), an area that is
associated with spatial processing and covert shifts of attention
(Corbetta, Miezin, Shulman, & Petersen, 1993; Nobre et al., 1997).
Via these connections, information about eye-gaze direction could
project to spatial attention systems to initiate orienting of attention
in the corresponding direction, as in joint attention. Indeed, passive
viewing of a face with averted gaze elicits a stronger response in
the IPS than viewing a face with direct gaze (Hoffman & Haxby,
2000). In addition, activity in the STS and fusiform area is corre-
lated with activity in the IPS when a face with deviated gaze is
seen (George, Driver, & Dolan, 2001; Pelphrey et al., 2003; see
also Wicker et al., 1998). The relation between gaze perception
and spatial attention is apparent in recent behavioral studies that
demonstrated that perceived gaze direction can trigger reflexive
attention shifts in the corresponding direction in the observer.
How Is Accurate Gaze Perception Achieved?
A wide range of species, from black iguanas and hog-nosed
snakes to nonhuman primates and humans, have a very accurate
ability to determine whether they are being looked at (e.g., Burger,
Gochfeld, & Murray, 1992; Burghardt & Greene, 1990; Perrett &
Mistlin, 1991). The unique morphology of the human eye means
that “useful information can be recovered from it with robust
simple processing mechanisms” (Langton et al., 2000, p. 52).
Compared with other primates, humans have a relatively small
dark region (the pupil and iris) and large regions of white sclera to
either side of the iris (Kobayashi & Kohshima, 1997). This makes
the discrimination of gaze direction much easier in humans than in
other animals. J. J. Gibson and Pick (1963) showed that the
participant’s threshold for accepting truly deviated gaze as direct
gaze is just 2.8°. However, the accuracy of discerning deviated
gaze declines as the angle of gaze becomes smaller (e.g., 98%
correct at 10° compared with 71% correct at 5°; R. Jenkins et al.,
2006). Nonhuman primates such as adult rhesus monkeys can
discriminate between photographs depicting direct gaze and gaze
averted by 5°, the same ability that has been reported in human
infants (Campbell, Heywood, Cowey, Regard, & Landis, 1990;
Symons, Hains, & Muir, 1998).
When participants observe eyes with inverted polarity (i.e., dark
sclera, light iris), gaze perception is severely disrupted (Ric-
ciardelli, Baylis, & Driver, 2000; Sinha, 2000). That is, partici-
pants fail to report that the face is looking in the direction of the
(now white) pupil, which is the same shape and size as before, but
often report the direction of the (now dark) sclera (see Figure 1,
compare Panels A and B). Ando (2002) showed that a similar
effect is found when participants are presented with a face with
direct gaze but either the left or right section of sclera is presented
as grey (Figure 1, Panel C). However, as Ando (2002) noted, the
geometry of the eye must also be important because an eye
represented only by the outlines of an oval and a circle, with no
luminance contrast at all, is sufficient to determine gaze direction
(see Figure 1, Panel D). Ando suggested that both luminance and
geometry may be important but that their processing demands may
mean that luminance is computed quickly for a raw representation
of gaze direction, whereas a geometric analysis of gaze direction is
more resource consuming and more vulnerable to noise.
Higher level factors also influence where we think someone is
looking. For example, people usually look at objects rather than
empty space. Lobmaier, Fischer, and Schwaninger (2006) demon-
strated this flexibility in the system by showing that the presence
of an object near the line of observed sight causes the perceived
gaze direction to gravitate toward the object. Hence, assumptions
about where people tend to look override pure perceptual geometry
(see also Todorovic, 2006, for further evidence that geometry
cannot fully explain gaze perception). The perception of gaze
Figure 1. Illustration of the influence of luminance contrast and geometry
on gaze perception. Panel A shows “normal” cartoon eyes with geometry
and luminance preserved. Panel B is the contrast inverted version of Panel
A, which has been shown to result in difficulty in gaze discrimination
tasks. Panel C shows how making the left or right sclera of the eyes darker
(which could happen in shadow or other suboptimal lighting conditions)
can influence gaze perception. Panel D shows an example in which both
sclera and pupil are white, but the geometry is preserved.
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direction can further be influenced by its face context. For in-
stance, although people are generally highly accurate in assessing
whether someone else’s gaze is directed at them, these judgments
tend to err when the observed face is not oriented toward the
observer but at an angle to the left or right (Anstis, Mayhew, &
Morley, 1969; Cline, 1967; J. J. Gibson & Pick, 1963). Perception
of gaze direction is also impaired when the face is inverted, a
manipulation thought to disrupt holistic or configural processing
(e.g., Vecera & Johnson, 1995; Yin, 1969). However, inverting the
eye region alone (independently of the face context) impairs judg-
ments of gaze direction, too, suggesting that configural processing
of the eye region itself rather than, or perhaps in addition to,
configural processing of the face as a whole contributes to per-
ception of gaze direction (J. Jenkins & Langton, 2003).
What Are the Effects of Eye Contact?
Eye contact has profound effects on the receiver (e.g., Kleinke,
1986). Indeed, the ability to discriminate between direct and
averted gaze that is found across different species may have
evolved because direct gaze can signal that a predator is attending,
making its detection an important tool for survival (Emery, 2000).
Many animal species respond to the presence of staring eyes with
displays of fear and submission, indicating that such stimuli act as
warning cues (Gallup, Cummings, & Nash, 1972; Hennig, 1977;
Ristau, 1991; Schwab & Huber, 2006; see also Beausoleil, Staf-
ford, & Mellor, 2006). In humans, prolonged eye contact can also
be perceived as an aggressive approach signal, as it leads to
increases in galvanic skin response, as compared with observation
of averted eye gaze in adults (Nichols & Champness, 1971).
Establishing eye contact also acts as a signal of attraction
between people. For example, recent research has shown that when
a person is seen to move their eyes to engage in eye contact, they
are perceived as more likable and attractive than if they are seen to
disengage eye contact (Mason, Tatkow, & Macrae, 2005). Mason
et al. (2005) further found that the (female) faces shifting their
gaze toward the observer were rated as more attractive by male
participants but not by female participants (see also Vuilleumier,
George, Lister, Armony, & Driver, 2005). A study by Jones,
DeBruine, Little, Conway, & Feinberg (2006) showed that this
kind of effect is modulated by emotional expression. That is, faces
looking at you are perceived as more attractive when smiling than
when holding a neutral expression, whereas faces looking away
from you are less attractive when smiling than when holding a
neutral expression. This not only shows that eye contact influences
perception of another’s attractiveness but also that this effect is
modulated by the social context of the judgment, that is, the
perceived relationship between the observer and the observed
party.
It is not surprising that people are highly sensitive to being
attended to (i.e., gazed at) by others. The subjective feeling of
being “looked at” is a common experience, suggesting that people
may have a predisposition to the detection of the gaze of others.
Such a predisposition may be supported by a dedicated module, an
“eye direction detector,” for example (Baron-Cohen, 1995). Dur-
ing visual search, eyes that are looking at the observer are found
more efficiently than are eyes that are looking elsewhere, suggest-
ing that attention is guided or captured by direct gaze (Conty,
Tijus, Hugueville, Coelho, & George, 2006; Senju, Hasegawa, &
Tojo, 2005; von Gru¨nau & Anston, 1995). Senju & Hasegawa
(2005) showed that detection of peripherally presented targets was
delayed when a central face stimulus was gazing ahead compared
with when its gaze was averted or the eyes were closed. When a
temporal gap was introduced between the offset of the face stim-
ulus and the appearance of the target, this delay was no longer
evident. Thus, it appears that direct gaze both captures attention
and delays disengagement of attention from the face stimulus.
Seeing a face with direct gaze engages the observer’s attention,
perhaps because of the social significance conveyed by eye contact
(see Baron-Cohen, 1995). Indeed, activity in the fusiform area is
enhanced when the observed face is looking at the observer com-
pared with when its gaze is directed away from the observer,
indicating that it receives preferential processing in the former
condition (George et al., 2001). It is known that attended faces
elicit stronger fusiform activity than do faces that are presented
outside the focus of attention (Wojciulik, Kanwisher, & Driver,
1998). Thus, the differential fusiform activation observed by
George et al. (2001) likely reflects attentional modulation. The
notion that direct gaze facilitates processing of the observed face is
supported by behavioral evidence showing improved performance
on gender categorization and face recognition tasks when the face
stimuli display direct rather than averted gaze (Hood, Macrae,
Cole-Davies, & Dias, 2003; Macrae, Hood, Milne, Rowe, & Ma-
son, 2002; Mason, Hood, & Macrae, 2004; see also Smith, Hood,
& Hector, 2006, for a similar finding in children). Furthermore,
when an approaching person is seen to suddenly shift gaze toward
the participant, greater STS activity is elicited as compared with
that when the person disengages mutual gaze (Pelphrey, Viola, &
McCarthy, 2004). Similar effects have been found in the superior
temporal gyrus, where greater activity is shown while making
judgments of emotional expression when the face is making eye
contact (Wicker, Perrett, Baron-Cohen, & Decety, 2003).
As well as modulating affective and neurophysiological re-
sponses to “lookers,” being looked at can influence seemingly
unrelated behavior, even when the eyes are simple “eyespots” on
a computer screen. Haley and Fessler (2005) showed that in an
experimental economic game in which participants could choose
whether to share money with their fellow participants, more money
was shared by participants whose irrelevant computer backdrop
contained schematic eye stimuli compared with a backdrop with
no eyes present. In this situation, increased economic fairness and
collaboration presumably resulted from the feeling of being
watched.
Gaze Perception and Joint Attention in Development
As already noted, a strikingly strong sensitivity to eye gaze is
observed from birth (Farroni, Csibra, Simion, & Johnson, 2002),
and this sensitivity is key to the development of social cognition in
early life (see Striano & Reid, 2006, for a recent review). The
behavior of joint attention may emerge because of the activation of
an innate module attuned to the visual appearance of eyes (Baron-
Cohen, 1995) or because of a less dedicated mechanism that
develops from associating high contrast black stimuli (pupils) with
interesting objects and reward (Moore & Corkum, 1994). Young
infants smile more at faces with visible eyes (Spitz & Wolf, 1946,
as cited in Argyle & Cook, 1976) and even neonates prefer to gaze
at a face with the eyes visible (Batki, Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright,
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Connellan, & Ahluwalia, 2000; Farroni et al., 2002). Evidence for
enhanced processing of direct gaze, as compared with averted
gaze, also comes from event-related potentials recorded from
4-month-olds (Farroni et al., 2002; Farroni, Johnson, & Csibra,
2004). Around this age, this sensitivity to direct gaze results in
deeper face processing (Farroni, Massaccesi, Menon, & Johnson,
2007), just as it does in adults (Hood et al., 2003). At 5 months,
infants can already discriminate between very small horizontal
deviations (5°) of eye gaze (Symons et al., 1998). However, the
ability to explicitly determine whether an adult is making eye
contact, or where an adult is looking, may not develop until the age
of 3 years (Doherty & Anderson, 1999).
Gaze following is the behavior of central relevance to this
review. Orienting one’s own attention (overtly, through eye move-
ments or head turns, or covertly through a shift of spatial attention)
to the direction of another’s gaze has been the subject of intense
research in infant development. Scaife and Bruner (1975) found
that infants reliably follow caregivers’ head turns within the 1st
year of life, whereas Hood, Willen, and Driver (1998) showed that
observing shifts of eye gaze by a face presented on a computer
screen resulted in facilitated saccades to the direction of gaze in
infants as young as 3 months old. The possibility that even neo-
nates can follow gaze has been suggested by one study, as long as
the pupils are seen to move (Farroni, Massaccesi, et al., 2004).
Clearly, the capacity to use another person’s eye gaze as a cue to
attention develops very early in life.
Despite its early emergence, the use of gaze cues by young
infants seems to be based on rather low-level factors. As noted by
Farroni, Massaccesi, et al. (2004), neonates must see the eyes
move to be able to follow the gaze of another person. That is, if the
eyes are seen statically looking left or right, joint attention is not
established. Therefore, the depth to which the infant understands
another person’s gaze behavior is unclear (see Butterworth, 1991;
Moore & Corkum, 1994, for reviews). Further evidence for “na-
ı¨ve” gaze following that really relies on following motion comes
from Moore, Angelopoulos, and Bennett (1997), who found that
9-month-old infants who had already developed gaze following
could follow gaze on the basis of the observation of static stimuli.
However, infants who had not yet developed spontaneous gaze
following needed to see the motion of the head turn to learn to
follow gaze—learning from static models was not found. Further-
more, if a gaze cue is produced by a lateral translation of the
stimulus face independently of the pupils, such that the pupils are
stationary but the facial movement results in averted gaze, 4- to
5-month-old infants orient to the direction of motion rather than to
the opposite side of space cued by gaze (Farroni, Johnson, Brock-
bank, & Simion, 2000), whereas adults always orient to the direc-
tion of gaze and not head movement (Bayliss, di Pellegrino, &
Tipper, 2005). The importance of motion to gaze following in
infants was confirmed in another study that showed that eye
contact prior to the motion of the pupils was necessary for early
gaze following (Farroni, Mansfield, Lai, & Johnson, 2003). This
suggests that gaze contact—engaging attention on the face—
followed by pupil motion, is vital to give rise to the more complex
behaviors involved in joint attention in infancy.
Although gaze cueing may be based on basic perceptual pro-
cesses initially, infants soon learn to use gaze cues flexibly. Be-
tween the ages of 12 and 18 months, infants begin to show signs
that they are not simply following the motion of head turns
because when the actors’ eyes are closed during the head turn, gaze
following occurs less often (Brooks & Meltzoff, 2002, 2005).
Furthermore, if another attention-engaging facial expression (such
as the expression of happiness or sadness) is made by the looking
face, joint attention is less likely to be engaged (Flom & Pick,
2005). Brooks and Meltzoff (2002, 2005) and Flom and Pick
(2005) found that 7-month-olds follow the gaze of a face with a
neutral emotional expression more strongly than they do when the
face looks happy or sad. Hence, although infantile joint attention
may be based on simple mechanisms, it quickly becomes sensitive
to the context in which the observed gaze behavior occurs. It is
interesting that around the same age that this new flexibility
emerges, other skills involved in face processing, such as recog-
nition of facial identity and emotional expression, become more
robust and sophisticated (see, e.g., Nelson, 2001, for a review).
The flexible use of other’s gaze direction to orient attention may
arise from higher level social cognition interacting with and build-
ing on a perhaps innate basic mechanisms for analyzing gaze
direction (cf. Baron-Cohen, 1995).
Despite emerging from arguably simple origins, gaze following
has a remarkable influence in the development of higher level
representations of other people’s perceptions. For example, orient-
ing to the object of a caregiver’s attention might allow the speedy
acquisition of nouns, through the pairing of an observed object and
its vocalized name (Baldwin, 1995). Indeed, gaze following at 6
months has been shown to correlate with vocabulary size at 18
months (Morales et al., 2000; Morales, Mundy, & Rojas, 1998).
The development of joint attention at 20 months can predict theory
of mind abilities at 44 months (Charman et al., 2001), demonstrat-
ing the importance of gaze following in the development of social
cognition. The development of joint attention behavior is also
associated with an increase in frontal lobe activity, crucial for
higher order representations (Mundy, Card, & Fox, 2000).
One fundamental concept that the developing child has to grasp
to achieve successful joint attention is the understanding that
people attend to their own actions. As such, observed gaze direc-
tion can be used as an indicator of another person’s future actions.
In fact, some cells in monkey temporal cortex that respond to the
observation of actions make this very distinction: They fire only
when the action is attended to by the actor; if the actor is gazing
away from their own hand, the cells do not respond (Jellema et al.,
2000). These cells may therefore form part of an intentionality
detection system. There is behavioral evidence supporting the idea
that during observation of actions, the observed person’s motor
intentions can be inferred by monitoring their eye gaze (that is,
whether they are focusing on the target of their action; Castiello,
2003; see also Pierno, Becchio, et al., 2006). Discerning another’s
intentions is a vital building block in social cognition. In line with
this notion, Amano, Kezuka, and Yamamoto (2004) found that
looking from an adult’s head to their hand was one of the first joint
attention abilities that emerge in development (after around 3 to 4
months). This is certainly an important skill because using joint
attention to understand and predict others’ actions is an integral
part of theory of mind and social perception.
Another central part of joint attention is orienting to the object
that is the current focus of another’s attention rather than showing
a simple spatial orienting response in the general direction of
observed gaze. It would be disadvantageous if an infant consis-
tently failed to orient to the exact object that an adult is looking at.
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For example, language acquisition (specifically, naming objects)
may be slowed if the referent of a novel word, as indexed by the
speaker’s gaze, is not accurately identified. There is no clear
consensus at what age infants stop simply orienting to the nearest
object in the general vicinity of the adult and instead turn their
attention more precisely toward the looked-at object (see Butter-
worth & Jarrett, 1991; Corkum & Moore, 1998; Moore & Corkum,
1994, for evidence that this does not happen until after at least 12
months). One study, however, has suggested that by 9 months,
infants can correctly orient to an object even in the presence of
closer-by distractor objects as long as the target object is in their
field of view (Flom, Dea´k, Phill, & Pick, 2004). Further evidence
for a relatively early appreciation for adults’ gaze behavior comes
from Moll and Tomasello (2004), who showed that 12- and 18-
month-olds will crawl a short distance to peek around a barrier
(obscuring the infant’s view) to inspect what an adult is looking at.
Hence, the infant rapidly learns that gaze can provide very
reliable information about another person’s likely object of refer-
ence or imminent action. Once these building blocks of joint
attention are in place, children can begin to use other people’s
orienting behavior for a more sophisticated “mind-reading” pur-
pose (Baron-Cohen, 1994). Baron-Cohen, Campbell, Karmiloff-
Smith, Grant, and Walker (1995) found that not only can children
ages 3 and 4 years old deduce the direction of gaze of a schematic
face, but they can ascribe mental states such as desires on the basis
of the direction of gaze. That is, if Charlie is looking toward the
chocolate bar, Charlie wants the chocolate bar (see also Lee,
Eskritt, Symons, & Muir, 1998). Thus, understanding that direc-
tion of gaze can indicate which objects a person knows exists, is
currently attending to, and holds a mental state about can help a
child infer much about the current visual world. Nevertheless,
children of the same age have difficulty coping with conflicting
information (Friere, Eskritt, & Lee, 2004; Pellicano & Rhodes,
2003). Pellicano and Rhodes (2003) found that when an arrow
pointed in a different direction to the eyes, children were unable to
correctly choose the object that was looked at by Charlie as the one
he wanted. This suggests that children’s use of eye-gaze direction
is vulnerable to interference at least into the 5th year of life.
By about the age of 5, children learn that the eyes can give
information that people want to hide from them. That is, the eyes
can help children detect deception—another vital step in the de-
velopment of theory of mind (Baron-Cohen, 1992; Leslie, 1987).
In the study by Friere et al. (2004), children ages 3–5 years were
lied to by an adult who claimed that she did not know the true
location of a toy, which was hidden under one of three cups.
Meanwhile, the adult looked toward the cup hiding the toy. The
3-year-olds performed poorly, unable to use the eyes to infer the
location of the cup, as if the verbal information dominated their
decision. The 4- and 5-year-olds, however, performed well (Ex-
periment 1). A further experiment found that children of these ages
also act differently when verbal and gaze cues are in direct oppo-
sition—if the toy is in the looked-at cup but the adult says it is in
a different location, 3-year-olds inspect the cup indicated verbally,
whereas the 5-year-olds correctly inspect the looked-at cup (Ex-
periment 3). It is interesting to note at this stage that children’s
increasingly subtle and flexible use of gaze is reflected in recruit-
ment of neural structures. That is, by at least 7 years of age,
children activate similar brain regions to adults when analyzing
gaze direction (Mosconi, Mack, McCarthy, & Pelphrey, 2005).
The development of gaze perception in infants may be due to the
use of simple systems (gaze perception) by higher level systems
dedicated to the establishment of a sophisticated picture of other
people’s overt behavior, future intentions, and mental states. Gaze
perception is crucial for joint attention and social cognition.
Hence, should this normal development of these simple gaze
perception and gaze-following mechanisms be impeded in any
way, profound implications for social cognition could result and
persist throughout development. This may indeed be the case in
children with autism, a developmental disorder affecting social
cognition.
Gaze Perception and Joint Attention in Clinical
Populations
The developmental disorder autism is characterized by a triad of
symptoms that relate to poor social, communicative, and imagina-
tion skills in affected individuals (Baron-Cohen, 2000). Children
with autism perform poorly on first-order tests of theory of mind
(e.g., understanding that “Mary thinks the marble is in the basket”)
and often fail on second-order tests (e.g., understanding that “Mary
thinks that John thinks the marble is in the basket”) compared with
normal children and children with Down syndrome (Baron-Cohen,
1989). Social interactions are also different from those of normally
developing children, as there are fewer attention-sharing behaviors
with other children and caregivers in children with autism (Sig-
man, Mundy, Sherman, & Ungerer, 1986). Shifts of attention are
more often made between two (nonsocial) objects rather than
between people (Dawson, Meltzoff, Osterling, & Brown, 1998;
Swettenham et al., 1998). Imitation, another index of learning
through experience sharing, is also impaired in children with
autism (Charman et al., 2001, 1997; Stone, Ousley, & Littleford,
1997). Furthermore, whereas normally developing children use the
speaker’s direction of gaze to infer the referent of a novel word,
children with autism tend not to use gaze cues in this manner,
which could play a role in the sometimes profound language
deficits prevalent in this population (Baron-Cohen, Baldwin, &
Crowson, 1997).
Thus, along with general learning, language, and IQ deficits,
children with autism present a highly impaired cognitive profile. A
variety of underlying problems have been postulated for the def-
icits found in autism. For example, theory of mind may not have
developed fully (Baron-Cohen, 1989), emotional systems may be
disrupted (e.g., the amygdala, Baron-Cohen et al., 2000), or ab-
normal function of the frontal lobes may lead to executive dys-
function (Hill, 2004). Other theories postulate that the presence of
“islets of ability” or even superior performance in certain tests of
cognitive ability demonstrate that a more comprehensive frame-
work, for example based on weak central coherence, is necessary
to explain autism (U. Frith & Happe´, 1994). It has further been
proposed that the autistic cognitive profile trades off empathizing
skills for systemizing skills (Baron-Cohen, 2002; Baron-Cohen,
Richler, Bisarya, Gurunathan, & Wheelwright, 2003; Baron-
Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001). One
major question of current research into autism is whether these two
sets of indicators of autism (weak central coherence and weak
theory of mind) are related or independent (e.g., Jarrold, Butler,
Cottington, & Jiminez, 2000; Morgan, Maybery, & Durkin, 2003).
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With regard to gaze processing, the evidence is clear that it is
treated very differently by people with autism than by people
without autism. When observing a face, normally developed adults
tend to scan the eye and mouth region in a highly consistent
manner (Mertens, Siegmund, & Gru¨sser, 1993). In contrast, people
with autism often dislike and avoid eye contact (see Baron-Cohen,
1988; Dalton et al., 2005; Pelphrey et al., 2002). Normal children
detect gaze contact quicker than averted gaze, whereas children
with autism are equally quick at detecting either gaze type (Senju,
Yaguchi, Tojo, & Hasegawa, 2003; Senju, Hasegawa, & Tojo,
2005). When the task demands exploring the eye region of a face,
people with autism show greater galvanic skin response and
greater neural activity in the fusiform gyrus and amygdala com-
pared with that of control participants, suggesting eye-region
avoidance is an arousal modulation strategy on the part of people
with autism (Dalton et al., 2005). Such behavioral traits are mir-
rored in people with social phobia, in whom scanning of faces
rarely includes the eye region (Horley, Williams, Gonsalvez, &
Gordon, 2002; Larsen & Shackelford, 1996).
Normally developing children make eye contact more readily if
a person is performing an ambiguous action than if the action is
unambiguous, whereas children with autism make little eye contact
whatever the action’s semantic context (Phillips, Baron-Cohen, &
Rutter, 1992). Indeed, when normally developed adults see a
person unexpectedly look away from an object, higher STS activ-
ity is elicited compared with when the person looks toward the
object. This modulation of neural activity in relation to violation or
confirmation of expected behavior is absent in autism (Pelphrey,
Morris, & McCarthy, 2005; see Zilbovicius et al., 2006, for a
review of the STS and autism). Ignoring contextual information
can be seen as a symptom of weak central coherence (see Brosnan,
Scott, Fox, & Pye, 2004). Furthermore, adults and children with
autism are poor at attributing emotions to people on the basis of the
eye region, something that normal attributers are proficient at
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1995; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill,
Raste, & Plumb, 2001; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, & Jolliffe,
1997).
Electrophysiological evidence for deviant gaze processing was
provided by Senju, Tojo, Yaguchi, & Hasegawa (2005; see also
Grice et al., 2005), who found different brain responses for direct
versus averted gaze in normally developing children, but such
differences were absent in children with autism. Because these
differences arise from processes thought to take place in occipito-
temporal areas, it is interesting to note that children with autism
appear to have lower gray matter densities in the STS (Boddaert et
al., 2004)—exactly the area considered to be responsible for gaze
processing (Perrett et al., 1992; Wicker et al., 1998). This, along
with structural differences in the cerebellum (Boddaert et al.,
2004), the frontal lobe (Hill, 2004), and functional differences in
the amygdala (Baron-Cohen et al., 2000; Dalton et al., 2005)
demonstrates the substantial anatomical divergence between peo-
ple with and without autism.
Given the well-established patterns of gaze aversion, it is no
surprise to find that joint attention is also impaired in people with
autism (e.g., Charman et al., 1997; Dawson et al., 2004; Leekam,
Lo´pez, & Moore, 2000; Roeyers, van Oost, & Bothuyne, 1998).
However, as with normal participants, better joint attention skills
are associated with larger vocabularies, and fewer social and
communicative difficulties, in people with autism, illustrating the
vital importance of joint attention in the social development of
children with autism as well as normally developing children
(Charman, 2003). Furthermore, orienting to the direction of anoth-
er’s gaze can occur at normal levels in children with high-
functioning autism (for whom IQ is within the normal range),
perhaps based on the same low-level motion cues from which joint
attention develops in normally developing children (Chawarska,
Klin, & Volkmar, 2003; Leekam, Hunnisett, & Moore, 1998;
Swettenham, Condie, Campbell, Milne, & Coleman, 2003; but see
Kyllia¨inen & Hietanen, 2004, who demonstrated gaze cueing in
children with autism by using statically averted gaze). Thus, it is
possible that although the low-level perceptual aspects of gaze
cueing (e.g., motion, luminance contrast, and geometry of sclera
and pupil) are intact in children with autism, it is the higher level
social cognition skills (e.g., attribution of emotional states) or their
interactions with those basic processes that are impaired; in other
words, the flexibility with which normally developing children use
gaze cues is lacking in autism.
Differences between children with and without autism are found
not only in how they orient attention to social stimuli (e.g.,
Dawson et al., 1998; Swettenham et al., 1998) but also with other
attentional abilities. Children with autism have been found to
display normal or superior attentional processing in visual search
and selective attention (Brian, Tipper, Weaver, & Bryson, 2003;
O’Riordan, Plaisted, Driver, & Baron-Cohen, 2001), and slowed
orienting of covert attention has also been noted in autism
(Townsend, Courchesne, & Egaas, 1996). We will return to these
issues when we have introduced the gaze-cueing paradigm more
comprehensively, so that we can evaluate how this and other
attention paradigms can contribute to knowledge about autism.
Theory of mind impairments often accompany the cognitive and
affective deficits encountered in schizophrenia. For example, fail-
ing to correctly attribute the agent of an action is a feature of
schizophrenia (C. D. Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000). People
with schizophrenia tend to misattribute actions of others to them-
selves, whereas normal participants are proficient at telling the
difference between their gloved hand performing an action on a
TV screen and the experimenter’s gloved hand performing the
same action (Daprati et al., 1997). Self–other confusion is char-
acteristic of mentalizing problems associated with schizophrenia
(Langdon et al., 1997), and when processing facial affect, people
with schizophrenia recruit premotor areas as opposed to the amyg-
dala. This suggests that a “mirror system,” which links the internal
representations of observed and executed actions, is hyperactive in
people with schizophrenia as they process other people’s mental
states (Quintana, Davidson, Kovalik, Marder, & Mazziotta, 2001).
Such overactivation of a facial mirror system may contribute to the
blurring of boundaries between potential mentalistic agents in the
environment. Despite all this, the accuracy of eye direction deter-
mination is good in people with schizophrenia, for whom perfor-
mance does not differ significantly from that of normal partici-
pants (Franck et al., 1998, 2002). This demonstrates that the lower
level aspects of gaze perception are normal in people with schizo-
phrenia. However, Langdon, Corner, McLaren, Coltheart, and
Ward (2006) present evidence that gaze-following systems are
somewhat overactive in people with schizophrenia.
Other syndromes that affect social cognition, such as Turner
syndrome (Elgar, Campbell, & Skuse, 2002; Lawrence et al.,
2003) and Williams syndrome, have also been investigated in gaze
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perception studies (Mobbs et al., 2004). Nevertheless, further work
is needed with these populations to more comprehensively deter-
mine the effect these syndromes have on gaze perception.
Use of Gaze Cues by Primates
The establishment of a dyadic joint attention relationship may
be a behavior that originally develops from stimulus–response
relationships and reinforcement, yet it is a higher level interper-
sonal skill that requires at least some level of theory of mind. To
take Emery’s (2000) definition, “Joint attention requires that two
individuals . . . are attending to the same object . . . based on one
individual using the attention cues of the second individual” (p.
588). This definition demands that attention is directed to the
appropriate feature of the environment, whereas gaze following is
perhaps simple orienting to the appropriate region or hemifield.
Shared attention is a higher state of the dyadic relationship
whereby both individuals are attending the same object, as with
joint attention, but both are aware of each other’s attentional state
(Emery, 2000). The subtle differences between gaze following,
joint attention, and shared attention are highlighted not only by
work with human infants but also in work with nonhuman pri-
mates.
For example, Myowa-Yamakoshi, Tomonaga, Tanaka, and Mat-
suzawa (2003) showed that chimp infants (ages 10–32 weeks)
have a preference for attending to direct human gaze. This result
mirrors that of Batki et al. (2000) in 36-hour-old human infants.
Furthermore, adult chimpanzees, like human infants, follow gaze
direction to appropriate objects in the environment (Tomasello,
Hare, & Agnetta, 1999). These animals have been shown to
display behaviors that suggest they possess the ability to compre-
hend psychological states, such as understanding that, relative to
themselves, a conspecific might have a different visual perspec-
tive, and hence might have access to different knowledge (Toma-
sello, Call, & Hare, 2003).
On the other hand, macaque monkeys (Deaner & Platt, 2003;
Emery, Lorincz, Perrett, Oram, & Baker, 1997; Ferrari, Kohler,
Fogassi, & Gallese, 2000; S. V. Shepherd, Deaner, & Platt, 2006)
show gaze following and some aspects of joint attention but cannot
use such cues to solve simple object-choice problems (Anderson,
Montant, & Schmitt, 1996; see also Vick, Toxopeus, & Anderson,
2006). Tamarind monkeys (Santos & Hauser, 1999), squirrel mon-
keys, and capuchin monkeys (Anderson, Kuroshima, Kuwahata, &
Fujita, 2004) seem to understand that the object of a human’s
action is likely to be the object they are looking at as they perform
the action (see also Jellema et al., 2000). However, baboons fail to
use gaze cues unless these are perfect predictors of stimulus
location (Fagot & Deruelle, 2002) or if they have competitive
motivation to do so (Vick & Anderson, 2003). These data suggest
that joint attention abilities vary between species, with some pri-
mates (especially chimpanzees) using social gaze to higher levels
than do others. Research is not restricted to primates. For example,
domestic dogs show stronger patterns of gaze perception than do
wolves (Miklo´si et al., 2003; see also Ga´csi, Miklo´si, Varga,
Topa´l, & Csa´nyi, 2004; and Emery, 2000, for reviews on primates
and other species). In some ways, the differences in primate use of
gaze resemble early stages in human infant development, before
the child learns to use those cues in a more flexible manner, and
also stages at which some people develop difficulties with social
cognition because of developmental disorders such as autism,
adult-onset disorders such as schizophrenia, or difficulties in face
perception caused by brain damage.
In summary, research on gaze processing has demonstrated that
humans are highly adept at detecting and encoding other people’s
eyes and direction of gaze in particular. This sensitivity develops
very early in life and allows for the development of a plethora of
other social and cognitive skills. Thus, the basic and perhaps innate
skills that enable the analysis of another person’s gaze direction
serve as building blocks for more higher level social cognition
abilities. In some clinical populations, this development is im-
paired, leading to profound social and cognitive difficulties. In the
following sections, the mechanisms that may be underlying this
joint attention behavior are discussed.
Gaze Cues and Orienting of Attention
We receive an abundance of visual information whenever our
eyes are open, but not all of this input may be relevant for our
current behavioral goals. Therefore, it is highly beneficial for our
cognitive system to be able to select pertinent input for further
processing by attending selectively to relevant aspects of the
environment. Orienting of attention refers to the alignment of
some internal mechanism with an external sensory input source
that results in the preferential processing of that input. This article
concerns visual attention specifically, therefore the term orienting
will henceforth refer to orienting to visual input. Orienting of
attention may be elicited and controlled in different ways, and,
consequently, a great deal of research has centered on attempts to
distinguish between different types of orienting or orienting pro-
cesses.
For example, Posner (1980) differentiated between overt and
covert orienting. Overt orienting involves the directly observable
orientation of sensory receptors and/or body parts toward a spatial
location or object to enable better processing of the target stimulus.
Thus, you may move your eyes and head toward an object of
interest that will allow the visual input to be foveated and to
receive optimal processing. Covert orienting refers to alignment of
an internal mechanism with some sensory input in the absence of
overt responses. Such “invisible” shifts of attention can be detected
by using response accuracy or reaction times (RTs) as a measure
of processing efficiency of a visual target. In the next section, we
briefly review prior research investigating attentional orienting to
set the scene for comparing and contrasting such orienting effects
with those evoked by gaze cues.
Spatial Cueing
Usually, some variation of the spatial cueing paradigm (Posner,
1980; Posner & Cohen, 1984; Posner, Nissen, & Ogden, 1978) is
used to investigate covert orienting. In a typical example of this
paradigm, participants are instructed to fixate on a marker at the
center of the screen and to respond to the onset of a target stimulus
that can appear to the left or right of the fixation marker by making
a speeded keypress response. The onset of the target is preceded by
some cue that elicits a shift of attention to either the left or right
(see Figure 2). Faster RTs and/or more accurate performance with
targets appearing in the previously cued location (compared with
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those in the uncued location) indicate attention shifts to the cued
location.
One way of distinguishing between different forms of orienting
is to examine the effects of different types of attention cues, in
other words, how attention is controlled. Such control is com-
monly assumed to manifest itself in two major types: (a)
bottom-up (exogenous, reflexive, or stimulus driven), and (b)
top-down (endogenous, voluntary, or goal driven).
Traditionally, bottom-up control is achieved by the capture and
guidance of attention by events in the visual field, often in the
periphery (Eriksen & Hoffman, 1974). Any dynamic perceptual
change such as a sudden change in luminance, texture, motion, or
depth automatically attracts attention (e.g., Oonk & Abrams, 1998;
Yantis & Hillstrom, 1994). In the basic peripheral cueing paradigm
(e.g., Posner & Cohen, 1984), two empty placeholder boxes are
arranged to the left and right of the central fixation marker. The
outline of one of the peripheral boxes is briefly brightened before
a target appears randomly in either box after variable cue–target
stimulus-onset asynchronies (SOAs). As soon as the target is
detected, the participant responds by pressing a key. The abrupt
increase in luminance of the peripheral box is assumed to trigger
a reflexive attention shift to the cued location that should facilitate
stimulus processing at that point in space (see Figure 2 Panel A).
Indeed, RTs are faster when the target occurs in the box that had
been brightened (i.e., cued) compared with targets in the opposite
(uncued) box. This type of orienting occurs rapidly and even
though the cue is not predictive of the actual target location.
Furthermore, instructions to ignore the cue fail to disrupt the
cueing effect that is observed even if the target is more likely to
appear in the uncued location (Jonides, 1981; Remington,
Johnston, & Yantis, 1992). Thus, this kind of orienting is consid-
ered automatic and reflexive because it cannot be suppressed.
The initial beneficial effect of peripheral cues on target detec-
tion is short lived. Facilitation declines between 150 ms and 300
ms after cue onset (Mu¨ller & Findlay, 1988). Even more striking,
this initial facilitation triggered by peripheral exogenous cues is
overcome by inhibitory effects at longer cue–target intervals. That
is, RTs to targets on valid trials (i.e., when the target appears in the
cued location) are now slower than are responses on invalid trials
(inhibition of return [IOR]; Maylor, 1985; Maylor & Hockey,
1985; Posner & Cohen, 1984). Posner and Cohen (1984) reasoned
that this result reflects the operation of two distinct components of
orienting. A sudden event in the environment triggers both facili-
tatory and inhibitory processes whose joint effect influences re-
sponses to targets in the environment (see also Maylor, 1985). If a
target occurs in close temporal proximity to a peripheral event,
facilitation dominates at the cued location resulting in speeded
detection of the target. Once attention is drawn to new locations,
inhibition becomes evident at the previously cued location, ex-
pressed in elevated RTs. They argued that such a two-fold orient-
ing mechanism would aid the detection of new events in the
environment by preventing attention from repeatedly returning to
a location that has already been examined. Hence, this phenome-
non has been coined “inhibition of return” (IOR) in reference to
the presumed purpose of the inhibitory orienting mechanism (Pos-
ner, Rafal, Choate, & Vaughan, 1985).
In contrast to this automatic control of attention, orienting in
response to centrally presented symbolic cues appears to be, at
least partly, under voluntary control (i.e., top-down). Such cues
may be an arrow pointing to one direction (see Figure 2 Panel B)
or other semantic cues such as a word indicating the likely target
location (e.g., LEFT). What these central cues have in common is
that, unlike peripheral cues, they do not directly indicate a spatial
location but rather require interpretation. Jonides (1981) presented
a central arrow that was, like peripheral cues, not predictive of the
target location. He found no evidence for the rapid attention shifts
associated with peripheral cues. In many subsequent studies, the
central cue correctly predicted the target location on most trials to
provide an incentive for the participant to orient in the direction of
the cue, bringing orienting of attention under voluntary control.
Under these circumstances, attention shifts were observed in re-
sponse to central cues (e.g., Posner, Snyder, & Davidson, 1980).
However, more recent studies obtained cueing effects even with
spatially nonpredictive arrow cues (e.g., Eimer, 1997; Hommel,
Pratt, Colzato, & Godijn, 2001; Pratt & Hommel, 2003; Ristic,
Friesen, & Kingstone, 2002; M. Shepherd, Findlay, & Hockey,
1986; Tipples, 2002). This suggests that orienting in response to
symbolic cues is not entirely under strategic control. It appears that
any reflexive component of symbolic cues may be evoked only
when the cue is asymmetric (like an arrow), allowing spatial
correspondence between the central cue and the target location to
be automatically paired (Lambert, Roser, Wells, & Heffer, 2006;
see also Lambert & Duddy, 2002). Nevertheless, there are differ-
ences in the effects produced by arrow and peripheral cues, re-
spectively. As opposed to peripheral cueing, orienting evoked by
the directional information of central cues can be suppressed if that
information conflicts with task demands, indicating that orienting
to central cues is less automatic than orienting to peripheral cues
(Jonides, 1981; see also Friesen, Ristic, & Kingstone, 2004). Also,
unlike peripheral cueing, attention shifts incited by central cues are
susceptible to interference arising from processing demands of
concurrent secondary tasks or orienting reflexes triggered by task-
irrelevant peripheral events (Jonides, 1981; Mu¨ller & Rabbitt,
1989).
Figure 2. Basic spatial cueing paradigm, using a peripheral sudden-onset
cue (Panel A) or a central symbolic cue (Panel B). In Panel A, the target
appears in the previously cued location (valid trial), whereas Panel B shows
an invalid trial in which the target appears in the uncued location.
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Different neural systems appear to be specialized in exogenous
and endogenous control of attention. Exogenous orienting is as-
sumed to be subserved largely by a posterior attention system
involving subcortical structures such as the pulvinar and the su-
perior colliculus (SC; Posner, Cohen, & Rafal, 1982; Rafal, Cala-
bresi, Brennan, & Sciolto, 1989). Endogenous orienting is presum-
ably supported more strongly by cortical areas in anterior (e.g., the
cingulate gyrus and the supplementary motor area, which are
involved in executive functions such as developing and maintain-
ing expectancies; Carr, 1992; see also Corbetta et al., 1993) and
posterior regions of the brain (e.g., intraparietal sulcus; Corbetta,
Kincade, Ollinger, McAvoy, & Shulman, 2000). Both systems,
which are specialized in bottom-up and top-down control, respec-
tively, are assumed to interact such that salient sensory events can
attract attention in a bottom-up fashion regardless of the ongoing
task, thereby interrupting top-down control (Corbetta & Shulman,
2002).
The time courses of the attentional effects produced by periph-
eral and central cues, respectively, appear to be characteristic and
different. Orienting in response to symbolic cues may arise more
slowly than does orienting to peripheral cues (Mu¨ller & Rabbitt,
1989); whereas peripheral cues produce their maximum facilita-
tory effects at cue–target intervals of approximately 100 ms, the
effects of central cues build up more gradually and achieve their
largest effects at SOAs of circa 300 ms (Cheal & Lyon, 1991).
Another distinction between the two forms of orienting is apparent
in the maintenance of cueing effects across time. Facilitation
effects triggered by central cues are sustained at optimum level
beyond their peak activation at 300 ms, whereas it is around this
time that the inhibitory effects of peripheral cues begin to reveal
IOR.
Although spatial visual attention has been studied extensively
over the past decades, the cues in these experiments were typically
artificial and arbitrary (e.g., the brightening of the outlines of
geometric shapes). In recent years, cognitive research has begun to
use more naturalistic, social cues of attention that had been used by
studies in developmental psychology for decades: the perceived
direction of another person’s eye gaze. As noted, another’s eye-
gaze direction communicates information about important events
in the environment. People are typically looking toward the objects
to which they are attending so that the relevant input receives
optimal perceptual processing. Therefore, the encoding and inter-
pretation of another person’s gaze direction enables the observer to
detect that person’s focus of attention and to align their own
attention accordingly.
Gaze Cueing
In studying the precise cognitive mechanisms underlying atten-
tion shifts in response to observed eye-gaze direction, modifica-
tions of Posner’s cueing paradigm have been used (see Figure 3).
Participants view a face stimulus at the center of the display. The
gaze direction of that face substitutes the peripheral onset or
symbolic arrow cues used in previous studies of attention orient-
ing. In one of the first investigations of eye-gaze cueing, Friesen
and Kingstone (1998) explored whether observed gaze shifts, like
traditional attention cues such as peripheral luminance increases or
central arrows, produce orienting responses in adults. Participants
were asked to respond to target letters that appeared to either the
left or the right of a schematic face with varying SOAs after the
pupils of the face appeared, constituting a directional gaze cue.
The response required was either the mere detection of the target’s
appearance or the indication of its location or its identity by
pressing appropriate response keys. The eyes of the face looked
either left, right, or straight ahead. On valid trials, the target
appeared in the gazed-at location, whereas on invalid trials, it
occurred in the opposite location. On neutral trials, the face gazed
ahead, and the target appeared randomly on either side. Partici-
pants were informed that the direction in which the eyes looked
was not predictive of the location or the identity of the target or of
when it would appear. Thus, the eye gaze of the face was used as
a centrally presented but spatially uninformative cue. The results
of the experiment showed that RT was facilitated on valid-cue
trials relative to neutral and invalid-cue trials, independent of
response type. This cueing effect emerged relatively rapidly at
short cue–target SOAs (105 ms in two response conditions and 300
ms in all response conditions) and disappeared with longer SOAs
(1,005 ms). Thus, another’s gaze shift results in a corresponding
shift of attention in the observer, which has been labeled reflexive
and therefore likened to orienting in response to peripheral cues.
A separate study by Driver et al. (1999) used photographs of a
face whose eyes were looking to the right or to the left as a central,
spatially uninformative cue. Participants were required to discrim-
inate a target letter that could appear on either side of the face after
100, 300, or 700 ms. The pattern of results they obtained was
comparable with the findings of Friesen and Kingstone (1998).
RTs were significantly faster on valid compared with invalid trials
at 300- and 700-ms SOAs, even though the direction of gaze was
entirely nonpredictive of target location or identity. Indeed, in one
of their experiments (Experiment 3), participants were informed
that the target was four times as likely to appear at the uncued side
so that they would endogenously orient away from the gazed-at
location. Under these circumstances, facilitation was still obtained
for the cued location, but only at the 300-ms SOA. At the later
interval, a trend toward facilitation at the expected target side
emerged, suggesting that participants were able to eventually vol-
Figure 3. Basic gaze-cueing paradigm, using a schematic drawing (Panel
A) or a real-life photograph of a face (Panel B). Panel A shows a valid trial,
and Panel B an invalid trial. The photograph shown in Panel B is from the
“AR Face Database,” by A. M. Martinez and R. Benavente, June 1998,
CVC Technical Report #24. Reprinted with permission.
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untarily shift their attention in that direction (see also Downing,
Dodds, & Bray, 2004; Friesen et al., 2004). Together, these studies
demonstrated automatic shifts of attention in response to central,
spatially unpredictive cues that apparently cannot be suppressed at
short SOAs.
Gaze cues also trigger automatic overt orienting responses
(Mansfield, Farroni, & Johnson, 2003). Mansfield et al. (2003)
recorded eye movement latencies to a target presented to the left or
right of a face with averted gaze. Reliable facilitation effects were
obtained at a fixed SOA of 300 ms. It is interesting to note that
observing averted gaze could also elicit spontaneous saccades in
the direction of the cue prior to target onset, even though partici-
pants were instructed to fixate on the center during this period
(however, see Itier, Villate, & Ryan, 2007, who showed that when
overt attention is voluntarily directed away from the eyes by task
instruction, such spontaneous gaze following is less frequent,
presumably because the gaze direction signals are weaker when
presented further from the fovea). This suggests that observing
another’s gaze shifts may evoke a similar motoric program in the
observer. Such simulated or “mirrored” activations of motor pro-
grams by the mere observation of actions have previously been
reported with hand reaching and grasping actions (e.g., di Pelle-
grino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992; Grafton, Ar-
bib, Fadiga, & Rizzolatti, 1996). The notion that a similar mirror
system may also exist for the oculomotor domain is supported by
the finding that similar cortical regions are recruited during exe-
cution and observation of eye movements (Grosbras et al., 2005).
The involuntary cue-driven saccades recorded by Mansfield et al.
did not, however, account for their observed cueing effects be-
cause the results for target-driven saccades were the same when
cue-saccade trials were excluded.
In a somewhat different task, Ricciardelli, Bricolo, Aglioti, and
Chelazzi (2002) investigated whether seen gaze can interfere with
goal-driven saccades. In their experiments, potential saccade tar-
gets were presented to the left or right of fixation. An instruction
cue signaled that a saccade was to be made to one of those targets.
A distractor face with averted gaze was then displayed at the
center. Saccadic performance to the target was less accurate when
the gaze cue was incongruent with the saccade instruction (i.e.,
when the face gazed at the nontarget). This effect was less pro-
nounced if an arrow was used as the distracting direction indicator.
Taken together, these two studies demonstrated that observation of
averted gaze can trigger both covert and overt automatic orienting
responses (see also Friesen & Kingstone, 2003a). Furthermore,
observing gaze, but not arrow cues, evokes a tendency to execute
saccades in the corresponding direction, imitating the observed
behavior.
Early demonstrations of gaze cueing consistently lacked evi-
dence of IOR. Friesen & Kingstone (2003b) used an elegant
procedure showing that facilitation effects of gaze cueing and
inhibition effects of peripheral cueing co-occur at the same SOA
and at different locations in response to the same stimulus. In their
study, four empty circles were presented. The features of a cartoon
face, with its gaze straight ahead or averted, then appeared
abruptly in one of the circles. Thus, the same stimulus could serve
as a directional gaze cue as well as a sudden-onset cue. RTs were
fast when the target appeared in the gazed-at location (facilitation
effect) but were slow when it occurred in the location that was
cued by the sudden onset of features (IOR). Critically, the mag-
nitude of the IOR effect was unaffected by whether a gaze cue was
concurrently presented. Because the magnitude of IOR is known to
decrease when distributed over several locations (e.g., Tipper,
Weaver, & Watson, 1996), Friesen and Kingstone (2003b) argued
that IOR and gaze-triggered facilitation effects were separate and
independent phenomena and that gaze cues do not elicit inhibition
processes. However, facilitation and inhibition processes have
been shown to co-occur even when triggered by the same type of
cue (Danziger & Kingstone, 1999). Therefore, the coexistence of
gaze cueing and peripheral cueing effects may not be a reliable
indicator for a lack of IOR with gaze cues.
Friesen and Kingstone (2003a) also provided evidence that gaze
cueing and IOR are subserved by different neural systems. They
found that unlike IOR, gaze cueing does not interact with an
attention phenomenon known as the gap effect.2 This term refers
to speeded responses to a peripheral target when the onset of the
target is preceded by the offset of the fixation stimulus, compared
with those of conditions in which the fixation point remains visible
during presentation of the target (Fischer & Ramsperger, 1984).
Like IOR, the gap effect is thought to be mediated by the SC
(Dorris & Munoz, 1995; Munoz & Wurtz, 1995a, 1995b; Schiller,
Sandell, & Maunsell, 1987; Sparks & Mays, 1983). The lack of an
interaction between gaze cueing and the gap effect suggests that in
contrast to IOR, the SC is not directly implicated in gaze cueing.
Rather, the SC may be activated only as a consequence of the
engagement of attentional networks (Nummenmaa & Hietanen,
2006) as revealed by saccade curvature analysis (e.g., Sheliga,
Riggio, Craighero, & Rizzolatti, 1995; Tipper, Howard, & Paul,
2001).
Nevertheless, IOR is a multifaceted phenomenon that implicates
various cortical areas as well as established subcortical structures
such as the SC (e.g., Dorris, Klein, Everling, & Munoz, 2002; Ro,
Farne´, & Chang, 2003; Tipper, Weaver, Jerreat, & Burak, 1994;
Vivas, Humphreys, & Fuentes, 2003) and is not necessarily re-
stricted to one type of cueing. Indeed, although initial studies
failed to demonstrate IOR with centrally presented symbolic cues
such as arrows (e.g., Posner & Cohen, 1984), inhibition is obtained
with these cues if the observer’s oculomotor system is activated
(Abrams & Dobkin, 1994; Posner et al., 1985). For example, Rafal
et al. (1989) compared cueing effects in response to peripheral and
central cues while manipulating eye movement responses to the
cue: Participants were instructed to either keep fixated at the
center, to execute a saccade in the direction of the cue, or to
prepare a saccade to the cued location that was to be executed only
if a target appeared subsequently (a brightening of the central
fixation box otherwise signaled that the saccade should be can-
celled). Inhibition at the cued location was observed in all periph-
2 Senju and Hasegawa (2005) have demonstrated that the gap effect does
interact with the attentional impact of the observation of direct gaze. We
thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out that this implies that the SC
is involved in holding attention on a direct gazing face but not in generating
the shift of attention induced by the observation of an averted gaze cue, as
shown by Friesen and Kingstone (2003a). Note also that in gaze-cueing
studies with infants, the central face stimulus is removed prior to target
onset, akin to the gap effect paradigm (e.g., Farroni et al., 2000; Hood et
al., 1998). It is, however, unclear whether the resulting facilitated disen-
gagement of attention from the face stimulus is necessary to achieve gaze
cueing in babies.
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eral cue conditions but also emerged in the central cue conditions
that required direct activation of the oculomotor system (i.e.,
saccade execution and preparation). Akin to these experiments,
gaze studies present the cue at the center of the display, and
saccades are evoked in response to the cue but typically suppressed
(Ricciardelli et al., 2002). It is therefore puzzling that IOR should
not be observed in response to these cues.
In a series of experiments, Frischen and Tipper (2004) demon-
strated that inhibition effects can be obtained in response to eye-
gaze cues. They noted that previous demonstrations of gaze-cueing
effects possessed experimental features associated with failures to
obtain IOR effects: Usually, the gaze cue was presented until target
appearance. However, even with peripheral sudden-onset exoge-
nous cues, IOR is not observed if there is a temporal overlap
between cue and target onset (Collie, Maruff, Yucel, Danckert, &
Currie, 2000; Maruff, Yucel, Danckert, Stuart, & Currie, 1999).
Furthermore, Posner and Cohen (1984) proposed that attention
needs to be withdrawn from the cued location for inhibition to be
observable (see also Danziger & Kingstone, 1999). This is usually
achieved by presenting a second cue at fixation, a feature that was
also lacking in gaze-cueing paradigms. Frischen and Tipper (2004)
attempted to draw attention away from the gazed-at location by
shifting the gaze of the face back to the center and by offsetting the
face stimulus between cue and target appearance. In these condi-
tions, they did indeed observe reliable inhibition effects, but only
at a considerably extended SOA of 2,400 ms, whereas at shorter
intervals of 1,200 ms, no cueing effects were observed (cf. Friesen
& Kingstone, 1998; Langton & Bruce, 1999). This gaze-evoked
IOR contrasts dramatically with that evoked by peripheral cues,
with which IOR is usually observed from around 200 ms following
cue onset and reliably within 1,000 ms (see Samuel & Kat, 2003,
for a review and meta-analysis). Frischen and Tipper (2004) spec-
ulated that another’s gaze direction is a very powerful attentional
cue potentially signaling important events in the environment so
that the observer is reluctant to withdraw attention from the
gazed-at location. At 1,200 ms, concurrent facilitation and inhibi-
tion processes may cancel each other out so that the observed net
effect shows no difference between valid and invalid trials (cf.
Danziger & Kingstone, 1999; Posner & Cohen, 1984). Thus, only
after a fairly long interval, inhibition becomes dominant and is
revealed behaviorally.
The observation of IOR with gaze cues seems to depend on an
active trigger to draw attention away from the gazed-at location.
Frischen, Smilek, Eastwood, and Tipper (in press) observed inhi-
bition at a 2,400-ms SOA only when the face stimulus disappeared
between cue and target onset, but no significant effect emerged at
the same interval when the face remained in view throughout the
trial. When a sudden luminance change around a visible face
stimulus was used as a perceptual cue between gaze cue and target
onset, inhibition was again evident at a 2,400-ms interval. Again,
however, no cueing effect was observed at a shorter SOA (1,200
ms). Together, these findings show that gaze-cueing results in both
prolonged facilitation and a delayed onset of inhibition processes
at the gazed-at location.
In summary, gaze cueing is a very robust phenomenon that in
some ways resembles the effects traditionally obtained with pe-
ripheral sudden-onset cues. Perceiving another’s gaze direction
reliably triggers both covert and overt shifts of attention in the
corresponding direction. Given that eye gaze is typically seen in
the context of a face, we will now examine the extent to which
gaze cueing is affected by face perception, and vice versa.
Gaze Cueing and Face Perception
The perception of another person involves many different facets
of face processing, from lower level configural aspects such as
head orientation, to semantic representations such as face identity,
and to affective and social inferences such as liking and person-
ality judgments. In this section, we review the literature on how
these different aspects of face perception influence gaze following
as well as to what extent the perception of another person is
affected by their direction of gaze.
A number of studies have investigated the relationship between
gaze and head orientation in cueing attention. Neurophysiological
evidence showed that cells in the macaque STS code for head and
gaze direction in the perception of social interactions and that cells
coding for gaze direction are dominant in determining the neural
response (Perrett et al., 1992). In other words, when presented with
both gaze and head direction as cues for the other’s focus of
attention, gaze takes precedence over head direction. Accordingly,
Perrett and colleagues (1992) proposed that directional informa-
tion from gaze, head, and body cues is combined hierarchically in
a mechanism dedicated to detect another’s direction of attention
(Perrett, Smith, Potter, et al., 1985). Nevertheless, recall that
behavioral studies showed that the perception of gaze direction is
affected by the orientation of the gazing head (Anstis et al., 1969;
Cline, 1967; J. J. Gibson & Pick, 1963). Similarly, judgments of
both head and gaze direction are equally impaired when they are
incongruent, implying that head orientation plays a larger role in
discerning social attention than was suggested by Perrett’s model
(Langton, 2000; see also Langton & Bruce, 2000). Indeed, there is
evidence that gaze and head orientation interact dynamically rather
than in a strictly hierarchical fashion in triggering orienting re-
sponses in the observer.
Langton and Bruce (1999) demonstrated that, like gaze direc-
tion, head orientation yields robust cueing effects. They presented
head stimuli that were averted to the left or right (full profile view),
up or down. RTs to targets that appeared at congruent locations
were faster than those to targets at incongruent locations. Whereas
head and gaze direction were always compatible in their study
(that is, the face was looking in the same direction that the head
was turned toward), Hietanen (1999) manipulated both cues inde-
pendently. In apparent conflict to Langton and Bruce (1999), he
found that congruency of head and eye orientation reduced the
cueing effect when the faces were averted by 30°. Similar results
were also obtained when head and body orientation were used as
cues; cueing effects were observed with incongruent but not con-
gruent signals (Hietanen, 2002). This may appear counterintuitive,
as one would expect combined cues to result in stronger orienting
responses. However, he argued that in this condition, the eye gaze
is not “averted” in terms of the observed person’s frame of refer-
ence; that is, although the head is averted, the face is in fact gazing
straight ahead. When the gaze of the laterally averted face is
shifted toward the opposite direction, the observer’s attention is
oriented accordingly (see Figure 4). This suggests that the other
person’s direction of attention is computed before being related to
the observer’s own frame of reference. Furthermore, when another
person is facing away from the observer (as in the congruent head
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and gaze condition), no interaction between both parties is estab-
lished. As a consequence, the other’s behavior is perceived to be
unrelated to the observer so that their direction of attention has less
signal value. Orienting in response to another’s direction of atten-
tion therefore appears to be sensitive to social context in terms of
their relation with the observer, which in turn is conveyed by a
dynamic interaction between perceived gaze, head, and body ori-
entation.
Whereas averting the head laterally clearly changes the per-
ceived social interaction between the observed person and the
observer, head orientation can also be manipulated in a nonsocial
manner by turning the stimulus upside down. Inverting the face has
been used extensively in face perception research, as it is known to
disrupt holistic processing, which is assumed to underlie face
recognition (Bartlett & Searcy, 1993; Yin, 1969). As noted before,
face inversion can also affect gaze processing (J. Jenkins & Lang-
ton, 2003). This suggests that gaze and face processing interact at
some level. If this interaction takes place at a level prior to the
engagement of attentional orienting mechanisms, then gaze cueing
could be disrupted. In paradigms using inverted faces, Kingstone,
Friesen, and Gazzaniga (2000) and Langton and Bruce (1999) did
produce some evidence supporting this idea in which gaze cueing
was abolished when faces were inverted (however, see Tipples,
2005, who demonstrated that such an interaction between face
orientation and gaze cueing is not mandatory).
Rotating the face isomorphically (i.e., clockwise or counter-
clockwise from the upright) serves a different purpose than does
using a laterally averted face: Rather than acting as an additional
attentional cue (cf. Langton & Bruce, 1999), the face provides a
context for a head-centered frame of reference. Previous research
suggested that face stimuli are encoded in terms of intrinsic head-
centered representations (Hommel & Lippa, 1995; Proctor & Pick,
1999). For example, the viewed left side of a face is encoded as the
left side regardless of its orientation in space. Thus, the left cheek
of an upside-down face would be encoded as the left part of the
face even though it is in fact presented on the right side of the
stimulus in pure spatial terms. This might explain why gaze-cueing
effects are sometimes disrupted when the face stimulus is pre-
sented upside down (Kingstone et al., 2000; Langton & Bruce,
1999) as attention would be simultaneously biased toward the
actual gazed-at side (spatial frame of reference) as well as the
opposite side that would be gazed at if the face was upright
(head-centered frame of reference, see Figure 5, Panel C).
To investigate how such head-centered frames of reference
would interact with spatial frames of reference, Bayliss, di Pelle-
grino, and Tipper (2004) used a face that was rotated 90° clock-
wise or anticlockwise. The face would in fact be gazing toward the
top or the bottom, but the detection targets would appear to the left
or right of the face. Hence, the targets were never directly looked
at. Without an active head-centered frame of reference, gaze-
cueing effects would be impossible. However, they did find sig-
nificant cueing effects as if the face had been presented upright.
For example, if the face was rotated clockwise 90° from the
upright position and gazed toward the top of the display, responses
were faster for left targets compared with right targets (see Fig-
ure 5, Panel B). Bayliss and Tipper (2006a) further showed that
viewing a rotated face simultaneously induces shifts of attention in
the direction where the face would have been looking if it had been
presented upright (i.e., left or right) and toward the actual spatial
direction of gaze (i.e., up or down). This showed that head orien-
tation influences gaze cueing such that attention is biased in
accordance with the canonical view of the stimulus as well as in
purely spatial frames of reference. It should also be noted that
observed gaze direction induces spatial “Simon” effects (Simon,
1969; Zorzi, Mapelli, Rusconi, & Umilta, 2003). That is, although
irrelevant to the task, the direction of observed gaze facilitates
responses made by the corresponding hand. For example, a face
looking left will result in quicker left-handed responses (as com-
pared with right-handed responses) made to another feature (e.g.,
the color of the iris). It is interesting to note that head-centered
gaze effects as reported by Bayliss et al. (2004; Bayliss & Tipper,
2006a) generalize to this procedure (Ansorge, 2003). Finally, in
further support for the representation of gaze in a head-centered
frame of reference, Seyama (2006) showed that adapting to a gaze
direction presented in misoriented faces (e.g., via repeated expo-
sure to the face oriented 90° clockwise shown in Figure 5b, in
which the inferred direction of gaze is to the left in head-centered
coordinates) influences judgments of gaze direction in upright
Figure 4. Illustration of the combined effects of head and gaze orienta-
tion. Panel A shows congruently averted head and gaze cues, as in Hiet-
anen (1999). Note that although head and gaze are averted to the left in
relation to the observer’s frame of reference, the face is in fact gazing
straight ahead. Accordingly, no cueing effects were obtained in this con-
dition. Panel B shows incongruent gaze and head cues. Although the head
is turned to the left, its gaze is averted toward the opposite direction. Thus,
the face is actually gazing to the right. In this condition, detection of targets
was facilitated when they appeared on the “gazed-at” side (in this case, on
the right).
Figure 5. Frames of reference in gaze cueing of attention. White arrows
indicate direction of cue in a spatial frame of reference, and black arrows
indicate the head-centered cueing direction. Panel A: Both spatial and
head-centered frames of reference are congruent with each other, so cueing
is strong. Panel B: Cueing occurs both in the direction that the eyes actually
look and at the location to where the eyes would have been looking had the
face been presented upright. Panel C: An inversion of the face now puts the
dual reference frames in direct opposition. Although never tested by
Bayliss and colleagues (2004), this condition was predicted to produce no
cueing, due to the competition between two frames of reference for control
of attention.
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faces (e.g., direct gazing faces are perceived as looking to the
right).
Despite surviving significant perceptual modifications of the
face stimulus, such as changes in orientation, gaze cueing can be
sensitive to top-down modulation. Ristic and Kingstone (2005)
presented an ambiguous stimulus that could either be perceived as
a cartoon face with a large hat (in which case the critical features
would serve as gazing eyes) or a cartoon car (in which case the
same features would serve as wheels). Robust cueing effects were
obtained only when the stimulus was referred to as a face, but not
when it was perceived as a nonface object. With the same stimuli
and instructions, Kingstone, Tipper, Ristic, and Ngan (2004)
showed that activity in STS was higher in the face than in the car
condition.
Although gaze perception and gaze cueing may be influenced by
both bottom-up and top-down changes to the face context, it does
not necessarily depend on face perception. That is, gaze cueing can
be triggered even when eyes are presented alone (Kingstone et al.,
2000). Local processing of the eye stimuli themselves may be
more critical in determining the magnitude of the gaze-cueing
effect than is the face context. For example, larger areas of white
sclera may enhance gaze cueing (a factor that may be important
when observing a fearful face; Tipples, 2005, 2006). Furthermore,
equivalent gaze-cueing effects are found with a wide range of face
stimuli, such as impoverished schematic drawings (e.g., Friesen &
Kingstone, 1998; Ristic et al., 2002), computerized faces (e.g.,
Bayliss et al., 2004, 2005), or rich photographs of faces (e.g.,
Bayliss & Tipper, 2005; Frischen & Tipper, 2004, 2006; Langton
& Bruce, 1999).
Frischen and Tipper (2004) further showed that the gaze-cueing
effect is not modulated by the identity of the face. In their study,
equivalent cueing emerged whether the same face was presented
throughout hundreds of trials or whether each trial showed a
different face. Hence, gaze cueing is neither abolished nor poten-
tiated by the novelty of the gazing face. Frischen and Tipper
(2004) also examined whether encoding of attentional states asso-
ciated with a particular object was underlying the gaze-evoked
inhibition effect they had obtained. Recall that in their experi-
ments, the face stimulus gazed to one side and then disappeared to
reappear a short while later gazing straight ahead. It was possible
that the attentional processes activated by the gaze shift were
retrieved when the same face was presented again and that this
influenced responses to the target. However, equivalent cueing
effects were observed when different faces were displayed during
cue and target presentation and even when a completely unrelated
nonface object followed the face producing the gaze cue. Thus,
even the “longer term” IOR effect was not coupled with a partic-
ular face identity.
Hence, the processing of face identity does not seem to influ-
ence gaze cueing. However, further work has shown that gaze
cueing can indeed be linked to processing of specific face identi-
ties under certain circumstances. Frischen and Tipper (2006) used
a gaze-cueing paradigm with distinct face stimuli, half of which
depicted famous people, as a means to produce distinctive episodes
that could be retrieved from memory. Participants viewed a face
shifting its gaze to one side and then processed a further 40
different faces shifting their gaze before the original face was
presented again after approximately 3 minutes. In this second
presentation, the face was gazing straight ahead and with a target
presented to the previously gazed at or ignored side of the face.
Under these circumstances, reliable gaze-cueing effects emerged
for famous faces and for the left visual field. This is in spite of the
fact that the target appeared 3 minutes after the gaze cue. These
long-term gaze-cueing effects require gaze and face identity to be
jointly encoded and later retrieved from memory. Kessler and
Tipper (2004) proposed that long-term cueing effects are most
likely to occur under optimal processing conditions that facilitate
encoding and retrieval of the episode. Encoding of gaze direction
(e.g., Kingstone et al., 2000, 2004), faces, and famous faces in
particular (Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1997) is predominantly
achieved in the right hemisphere. Accordingly, the most robust
long-term cueing effects are observed when famous faces orient
attention via a gaze shift toward the left visual field, projecting to
the right cerebral hemisphere. The specificity of the long-term
gaze-cueing effect to the left visual field lends further support to
the notion that attentional states can be encoded along with a
particular object. In particular, attention shifts that are evoked via
observed gaze can be associated with the specific face producing
the gaze cue, but only in specific experimental contexts.
In support of a role for identity processing under some circum-
stances in gaze cueing, Deaner, Shepherd, and Platt (2007) showed
stronger cueing for personally familiar faces even in a short-term
cueing task. Of interest, this was only found with female partici-
pants, whereas the cueing effects of the male participants to whom
the faces were familiar did not differ from those of the male
participants to whom the faces were novel. This highlights an
interesting issue of individual differences in gaze cueing, an issue
we will return to in a later section.
What about the relationship between perceived gaze direction
and changeable aspects of the face, such as the emotional expres-
sion? Intuitively, one would expect that gaze following should be
influenced by the nature of the observed facial expression. For
example, someone looking in a certain direction with a fearful
expression likely indicates the presence of something threatening
and potentially dangerous at that location. It would be adaptive for
the observer to focus their attention on that location more rapidly
or thoroughly than if the observed person had a benign or neutral
expression.
Surprisingly, behavioral studies have often failed to consistently
demonstrate a clear influence of emotional expression on gaze
cueing, at least when RTs are used as a measure. Hietanen and
Leppa¨nen (2003) varied the expression of the face in a gaze-cueing
paradigm independently of gaze direction. Although they used a
variety of emotional expressions (happy, angry, fearful, and neu-
tral), both with schematic drawings and naturalistic photographs of
faces, as well as a wide range of cue–target SOAs (14 ms to 600
ms), they found no evidence for an interaction between gaze
direction and facial expression. Mathews, Fox, Yiend, and Calder
(2003) also presented faces with either neutral or fearful expres-
sions. Furthermore, they distinguished between participants with
high and low trait anxiety because they reasoned that anxious
people would be more sensitive toward implied threat (such as
signaled by a fearful face; see, e.g., Fox, Russo, & Dutton, 2002).
They found that observation of fearful gaze resulted in larger
cueing effects than did observation of neutral gaze. Of noted
importance, however, this was true only for highly anxious par-
ticipants; the low anxious group showed no difference between
fearful and neutral gaze-cue conditions. More recently, Tipples
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(2006) noted that in both Hietanen and Leppa¨nen’s (2003) and
Mathews et al.’s (2003) studies, the emotional expression was
presented before the onset of the averted gaze cue. Tipples (2006)
showed that by simultaneously presenting the gaze cue and a
change in facial expression from neutral to emotional, orienting to
the direction of a fearful face was reliably potentiated. This finding
is also in line with neural imaging studies showing enhanced brain
activity in response to dynamic compared with static displays of
facial expression (Sato, Kochiyama, Yoshikawa, Naito, & Mat-
sumura, 2004). Just as in Mathews et al.’s (2003) study, this effect
of emotional expression was stronger in highly anxious partici-
pants (see also Holmes, Richards, & Green, 2006).
The effect of observed gaze direction on perception of emo-
tional expressions appears more reliable. Adams, Gordon, Baird,
Ambady, and Kleck (2003) reported that differential sensitivity of
the amygdala to faces displaying anger or fear varied as a function
of gaze direction. Amygdala activity was less pronounced in
situations that clearly signal a threat in the environment (e.g., a
fearful face with averted gaze) or clearly signal threat to an
observer (e.g., an angry face with direct gaze), than it was in
situations in which the source of threat requires additional inter-
pretation by the observer (e.g., an angry face with averted gaze or
a fearful face with direct gaze). Likewise, fearful faces coupled
with averted gaze and angry faces coupled with direct gaze are
recognized more quickly than are either fearful faces with direct
gaze or angry faces with averted gaze (Adams & Kleck, 2003).
Accordingly, Adams and his colleagues (Adams et al., 2003)
argued that the amygdala may play a special role in processing
threat-related ambiguity and that gaze is highly relevant in resolv-
ing such ambiguity. These findings are in line with the notion that
there are distinct patterns of neural activity involved in basic
approach and avoidance categories of emotion, motivation, and
affective response (e.g., Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999; Davidson,
1995; Davidson & Irwin, 1999). According to this view, an ap-
proach system operates through emotions that convey and moti-
vate social interactions (e.g., happiness), whereas an avoidance
system operates to facilitate withdrawal from aversive situations
(e.g., fear, disgust). Adams and Kleck (2005) extended their initial
findings by demonstrating the influence of gaze direction on the
perception of other approach (joy and anger) and avoidance (sad-
ness and fear) emotional expressions. Gaze direction influenced
the perception of faces with neutral, ambiguous, and prototypical
emotional expressions such that the dispositions of faces with
averted gaze were rated as more avoidance oriented than were
those with direct gaze. It is interesting to note that these results
show, contrary to the notion that direct gaze enhances face per-
ception relative to averted gaze (cf. Hood et al., 2003; Mason et al.,
2004), the way in which observed gaze affects face perception
critically depends on the specific emotion expressed. That is, for
avoidance-type expressions, perception is, in fact, enhanced by
averted rather than direct gaze.
Thus, as well as various aspects of face perception influencing
gaze cueing, the opposite interaction can be observed in which
gaze shifts can influence the way that the other person is perceived.
Of interest, neural activation related to processing of faces is also
sensitive to the context in which gaze shifts away from the ob-
server occur. For example, as noted previously, fusiform activity in
response to the same face stimulus changes depending on whether
the viewed face is shifting its gaze correctly to focus on a visual
target or whether it fails to do so (Pelphrey et al., 2003).
Bayliss and Tipper (2006b) investigated the context in which
observing another’s gaze shift away from the observer might
differentially influence perception of that individual’s personality.
Gaze shifts do not always indicate a point of interest in the
environment but can be used to deceive the observer instead (see
Emery, 2000, for a review). Even some nonhuman primates appear
to be able to derive when another individual cannot see a piece of
food within their own view and can use this knowledge to appar-
ently ignore the food by orienting elsewhere, thereby effectively
deceiving their opponent in food competition tasks (Fujita, Kuro-
shima, & Masuda, 2002; Hare, Call, Agnetta, & Tomasello, 2000).
In humans, observation of deceptive behavior influences the per-
ception of the associated individual. Faces perceived as being
deceptive are recognized better (Tanida, Shimoma, Mashima, Ma,
& Yamagishi, 2003) and are judged as less trustworthy (Singer,
Kiebel, Winston, Dolan, & Frith, 2004) than are those of cooper-
ative individuals. Bayliss and Tipper (2006b) used a gaze-cueing
paradigm in which some faces would always gaze toward the
subsequent target location (cooperative gaze), some faces never
gazed toward the target location (deceptive gaze), and others were
equally likely to gaze toward or away from the target (unpredictive
gaze). Speeded responses to the target were not influenced by gaze
contingency. That is, participants followed the gaze of all types of
face, despite the negative consequences of following the deceptive
faces. Although the gaze-cueing effect appeared to be blind to
these contingencies, there were consequences for what the partic-
ipants felt about the faces that had cued them. Specifically, faces
whose gaze never indicated the target location were judged as
being less trustworthy than were faces exhibiting cooperative gaze
behavior. It is of interest to note that participants felt that they had
viewed the deceptive faces more often, presumably because these
deceptive encounters are more important to commit to memory
than are the more natural cooperative episodes. This provides
further evidence that whereas gaze following is not usually influ-
enced by semantic properties of the face, observed gaze behavior
does affect perception of the other person.
Bayliss, Paul, Cannon, and Tipper (2006) demonstrated a some-
what different relationship between observed gaze direction and
affective response in the observer. They examined whether the
affective appraisal of objects depends on whether they are being
looked at by another person. Indeed, objects that had been looked
at were rated more favorably than were objects that had been
looked away from. This effect did not appear to be mediated by the
attention shift that was elicited by the gaze cue as there was no
relationship between the size of the gaze-cueing effect and the
“liking” effect. Furthermore, whereas similar cueing effects were
evoked by arrows cues, no affective boost for cued objects was
found. Thus, observed gaze elicits shifts of attention and influ-
ences emotional responses to objects, but these two effects appear
to be independent, with the affective response being specific to
social cues.
Bayliss, Frischen, Fenske, and Tipper (in press) investigated
whether this effect of observed gaze on object appraisal is further
modified by the emotional expression of the observed face. Studies
with infants have suggested that their preference for objects that
are the focus of another person’s interest differs depending on the
emotional signal expressed by that person. Objects that are inter-
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acted with when a person expresses happiness are subsequently
explored more than they are when the experimenter expresses
disgust (Mumme & Fernald, 2003; Repacholi, 1998). In Bayliss et
al.’s (in press) study, objects that were looked at with a happy
expression were liked more than were objects looked at with an
expression of disgust, although attention was equally cued in the
direction of observed gaze by happy and disgusted faces. These
results demonstrated that facial expression does modulate the way
that gaze cues are used by observers, such that objects that are
looked at by another person are evaluated with respect to the
valence of the observed facial expression.
Another person’s direction of gaze can also influence affective
judgments of other people. This effect is modified by gender
differences. Jones, DeBruine, Little, Burriss, and Feinberg (2007)
found that women rate male faces that are being looked at by a
female face as more attractive when the female face is smiling than
when it has a neutral expression. Conversely, men prefer male
faces that are being looked at by a female face with a neutral
expression compared with those that are being looked at by a
smiling female face. This shows that the effects of observed gaze
and emotional expression are sensitive to the perceived social
relation between the observer and the gazing face as well as to the
social relation between the observer and the face that is being
looked at by the other person.
This review of the literature on gaze and face perception sug-
gests that although information regarding gaze direction and face
identity or regarding expression appears to be processed in differ-
ent regions of the brain, these types of information can influence
each other. Judgments of gaze direction can be influenced by the
context of the face containing the eye region, and vice versa,
perceived gaze direction affects judgments of semantic aspects of
the face such as likeability or emotional expressions. These influ-
ences are further modified by the social context in which they
occur, for example, whether gaze or facial expression signal ap-
proach or avoidance. Likewise, the effect of face perception on
gaze cueing or the reverse relationship needs to be viewed in light
of the specific circumstances in which they occur. Although
changing perceptual or semantic properties of the face stimulus
does not appear to affect the short-term gaze-cueing effect in the
general population, such influences can be glimpsed when the
experimental context encourages encoding of individual face en-
counters or when taking into account individual differences in the
observers. Similarly, manipulating the contingencies between the
gaze cue and the target that is being gazed at does not change the
cueing effect but nevertheless influences evaluation of the face
itself. These findings highlight the need to take into account
contextual factors when considering the relationship between gaze
and face processing. Thus, rather than attempting to answer the
question whether these processes are modular or dependent on one
another, it seems more fruitful to try to define the boundary
conditions and examine the circumstances under which interac-
tions between gaze and face processing might occur and how they
manifest themselves.
Individual Differences in Gaze Cueing
The literature on sex differences in adults is extensive, both in
the domain of cognitive skills (e.g., spatial cognition, at which
male participants often perform better than do female participants;
Ecuyer-Dab & Robert, 2004; Geary, 1998) and in decoding of
nonverbal behavior (Hall, 1978). There is also recent evidence that
the mirror neuron system, discussed above, is weaker in male
systems (Cheng, Tzeng, Decety, Imada, & Hsieh, 2006). Individ-
ual differences in the sensitivity to other people’s eye gaze are
detectable very early in development by the age of around 12
months. Male infants make less eye contact (Lutchmaya, Baron-
Cohen, & Raggatt, 2002) and orient toward faces less (Connellan,
Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Batki, & Ahluwalia, 2000; Lutch-
maya & Baron-Cohen, 2002) than do female infants. A strong
biological component to the development of eye contact behavior
is suggested because of its early emergence and because of the
finding of a significant quadratic relationship between prenatal
testosterone levels and the amount of eye contact made (Lutch-
maya et al., 2002). Furthermore, a recent study has shown stronger
joint attention in female infants than male infants at 12 months
(Olafsen et al., 2006). Although the developmental and social
psychology literature had documented sex differences in response
to social stimuli such as faces and gaze, the attention literature has
rarely concerned itself with how males’ and females’ attention
systems may respond in simple cueing tasks.
Bayliss et al. (2005) investigated whether a reflexive phenom-
enon such as gaze cueing would reveal sex differences in a normal
adult population. The findings were striking: Male participants did
indeed display significantly weaker gaze-cueing effects than did
female participants (see also Deaner et al., 2007). Although the
gender difference in gaze cueing may have come as little surprise
to developmental and social psychology researchers, the idea that
such a simple orienting response is markedly different in one half
of the population may be an unexpected result in the research of
attention. To investigate whether this gender difference was spe-
cific to social cues, Bayliss et al. (2005) also compared male and
female performances with centrally presented arrow cues and
peripheral sudden-onset cues. Peripheral cueing revealed no dif-
ference between male and female performances. However, with
arrow cues, male participants showed no performance differences
at cued versus uncued locations, whereas female participants
showed a standard cueing effect (see also Merritt et al., 2005).
As well as the sex difference in Bayliss et al.’s (2005) data, a
negative correlation between gaze-cueing magnitude and score on
the Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ), developed by Baron-Cohen,
Wheelwright, Skinner, et al. (2001), was found. This questionnaire
was designed to be appropriate for testing nonclinical populations
to provide an estimate of the number of autistic-like traits that an
individual participant displays. In Bayliss et al.’s data, the higher
a participant scored on the AQ, reflecting more autistic-like traits,
the weaker was their gaze-cueing effect. This adds some support to
Bayliss et al’s assertion that the gender difference in gaze cueing
is somehow related to the fact that male individuals, on average,
share more cognitive traits with people who have a diagnosis of an
autism-spectrum disorder than do normal female individuals.
However, it is difficult to determine what the primary factor in an
individual’s response to a gaze cue is: Is it their gender or their
position on the autism spectrum?
In another study, Bayliss and Tipper (2005) tested mainly fe-
male participants’ performance at detecting targets appearing on
either whole or scrambled faces and, in a separate experiment,
targets on whole or scrambled tools. A gaze or an arrow cue served
as the nonpredictive cue to attention. Although significant cueing
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was found in all conditions, participants with low scores on the AQ
(i.e., fewer than average autistic-like traits) tended to display
stronger cueing toward whole objects than toward the scrambled
displays, irrespective of cue type. The high AQ participants (again,
mostly female) showed only slightly weaker cueing effects in
general, but their orienting style was different. Larger cueing
effects were found in this group when targets appeared on scram-
bled displays compared with those when whole objects appeared.
This finding has a number of implications. First, because high
and low AQ participants showed strong cueing effects, it suggests
that sex, rather than AQ score, may play a larger role in determin-
ing the overall strength of attention shifts evoked by central
nonpredictive directional stimuli. However, performance on the
AQ is correlated with the degree to which holistic stimuli attract
attention when they are cued. This interaction may relate to the
well-documented global processing bias in normal participants
(Navon, 1977), with people with autism showing a bias toward
processing local information (U. Frith & Happe´, 1994; Happe´,
1996, 1999; Mottron, Belleville, & Menard, 1999; Mottron, Bu-
rack, Iarocci, Belleville, & Enns, 2003). Bayliss and Tipper’s
(2005) data suggest that such orienting biases may vary within the
normal population as a function of position on the autism spec-
trum. This intriguing possibility may suggest that some sort of
weak central coherence may exist in the normal population and
that the global processing bias is not as universal as once assumed.
How do individual differences in gaze and arrow cueing
emerge? There are a number of possibilities that have implications
for research into social cognition and attention. First, it is possible
that the cognitive systems underlying gaze and arrow cueing are
separate and are both impaired in male individuals. Alternatively,
it may be that gaze and arrow cueing are built on the same
cognitive system, which is weaker in male individuals (the evolu-
tionary primacy and importance of gaze processing would mean
that arrow cueing was a secondary adaptation of the system). The
second of these explanations seems to fit better logically because
it would be inefficient to allow the evolution of an entirely separate
system that enables humans to reflexively follow other directional
signals than gaze. However, Hietanen, Nummenmaa, Nyman,
Parkkola, and Hamalainen (2006) provided evidence that there are
indeed dual systems for orienting to gaze and arrows. Hence, a
third, yet not mutually exclusive, possibility is entertained: Male
individuals have better control over how symbolic stimuli can
direct their attention. In most gaze-cueing studies, the participants
are informed that the direction of the cue is uninformative of target
location. Rather than having a weaker gaze/arrow-cueing system,
male individuals could have a more effective system of control
over their attention systems, being able to inhibit the irrelevant
gaze cues.
In some support of this notion, S. V. Shepherd et al. (2006)
reported individual differences in the use of gaze in nonhuman
primates. Low-status male monkeys demonstrated gaze cueing in
response to the averted gaze of peers and higher status monkeys,
with saccadic RT patterns that were indicative of reflexive orient-
ing. Higher status monkeys oriented more strongly to the direction
of other high-status males but were not influenced by the gaze cues
of lower status monkeys. This suggests a degree of voluntary
control over social attention. That is, whether gaze cueing appears
to be the result of reflexive or voluntary processes may be mod-
ulated by individual differences. Further, the high-status monkeys
had signs of having higher testosterone levels than those of the
low-status monkeys, which may form part of an explanation for
differences in human social attention (Lutchmaya et al., 2002) and
empathy (Hermans, Putman, & van Honk, 2006) and in turn help
explain the sex differences reported by Bayliss et al. (2005).
This notion that individual differences in gaze and arrow cueing
may be explained by differences in top-down control is worthy of
further investigation. It is likely that the two main hypotheses, that
processing of these cues is weaker in male participants or that male
participants are able to exert more control over the influence of
central cues, are both correct to some extent. That is, perhaps
slightly weaker processing of cues enables voluntary processes to
be engaged more readily such as to control the influence of gaze
and arrow cues.
The finding of significant individual differences in orienting of
attention in the general population warrants a note of caution for
the interpretation of data from neuropsychological studies. Such
studies often use patients with focal brain lesions to draw conclu-
sions about the neural architecture underlying cognitive phenom-
ena. However, given that these processes appear to vary widely
among normal individuals, it is often unclear how an individual
with brain damage would have performed prior to his or her injury.
For example, Vecera and Rizzo (2004, 2005) have presented
data that suggest that without a fully functioning frontal lobe, gaze
cueing does not occur. The patient, EVR, who has damage to the
frontal lobe, fails to orient to the direction of predictive or non-
predictive gaze cues. The authors use this as evidence against the
idea that gaze cues result in the automatic allocation of attention to
where someone else looks. That is, because the frontal lobes are
responsible for executive, voluntary control processes, damage to
the frontal lobe should not result in impairment of automatic
processes. Because gaze cueing does not appear in this patient, it
is concluded that gaze cueing in the general population cannot be
the result of a reflexive process. Although this conclusion may
eventually prove to be correct, the heterogeneity of gaze-cueing
effects in the normal population (Bayliss & Tipper, 2005; Bayliss
et al., 2005) leaves the very real possibility that the individual
patient EVR may have never shown gaze cueing before his lesion
occurred. Indeed, EVR is a male patient, so it is unsurprising that
he produced no gaze-cueing effects because male patients tend not
to do so (Bayliss et al., 2005).
Vuilleumier (2002) provided evidence for a special neural sys-
tem underlying eye-gaze cueing. Patients with lesions to tem-
poroparietal regions of the right hemisphere often present with
unilateral neglect, an attentional deficit for processing stimuli
presented on the left (contralesional) side of space (Rafal, 1998).
In its severe form, neglect can lead to a complete ignorance of the
left side of space in spite of an intact visual field. Extinction is a
more common residual deficit, whereby contralesional stimuli are
not reported only when a competing ipsilesional stimulus is
present. This may be because of greater competitive weight being
applied to the ipsilesional stimulus, to the additional detriment of
processing of the contralesional one (e.g., di Pellegrino, Basso, &
Frassinetti, 1997). In the Vuilleumier study, patients with neglect
were found to show improved detection of contralesional stimuli if
the competing ipsilesional stimulus was a face gazing to the
contralesional side. It is a surprising result because any concurrent
ipsilesional stimulation might be expected to impair performance
in extinction patients. Of noted importance, the reduction in ex-
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tinction was not repeated for arrow stimuli, suggesting that only
social cues of biological origin can ameliorate neglect. However,
later experiments showed that only gaze cueing, but not arrow
cueing, was found in the same patients. It is therefore unclear as to
whether a contralesional arrow would still have no effect in pa-
tients who display both arrow- and gaze-cueing effects.
Patients with focal lesions to the superior temporal areas are
rare in humans, but one such patient, with a right superior
temporal gyrus lesion, has been studied recently by Akiyama
and colleagues (Akiyama, Kato, Muramatsu, Saito, Nakachi, &
Kashima, 2006; Akiyama, Kato, Muramatsu, Saito, Umeda, &
Kashima, 2006). This patient, MJ, finds it hard to make eye
contact, and she is impaired at determining the direction of
observed gaze. We find it very interesting to note that MJ shows
no gaze-cueing effect, but nonpredictive arrows do cue her
attention. This is exactly what one would predict if the human
superior temporal gyrus is responsible for interpreting gaze
direction and for providing information to the attention system
regarding gaze direction, whereas a separate system encodes
arrows (Hietanen et al., 2006). This is in line with the results of
Vuilleumier (2002), whose patients with more dorsal lesions
showed the opposite dissociation, gaze cueing in the absence of
arrow cueing. Unfortunately, this single-case study, like the
study of Vecera and Rizzo (2004, 2005), cannot delineate the
neural basis of gaze cueing simply because lots of individuals
do not show gaze cueing. If the two types of cue are really
underpinned by separate neural systems, then one might expect
that gaze- and arrow-cueing effects do not correlate strongly
within an individual. At present, it is unclear whether people
who show strong arrow-cueing effects also exhibit robust gaze
cueing. This stresses the need for research to examine individ-
ual differences in performance in their own right rather than to
try to avoid their influences.
The intention here is not to criticize the work of Vecera and
Rizzo (2004, 2005) and Akiyama and colleagues (Akiyama, Kato,
Muramatsu, Saito, Nakachi, & Kashima, 2006; Akiyama, Kato,
Muramatsu, Saito, Umeda, & Kashima, 2006); after all, in the
literature, it has long been assumed that in nonpsychiatric partic-
ipants, gaze cueing is universal. It is now clear that this ubiquity is
not the case. Individuals can show a great range of cueing mag-
nitudes, in contrast to the effect of peripheral cues, which are
consistent across participants (Bayliss et al., 2005; it should be
noted that other laboratories have also noted that not all individuals
show gaze cueing; see Hietanen et al., 2006, p. 412). Instead,
rather than a universal effect, it is simply a robust effect given an
appropriately sized random sample. Therefore, when investigating
the neural basis of gaze cueing by analyzing behavior following
deactivation of a focal brain region, it should be noted that single-
case lesion studies may not be wholly adequate. In light of vari-
ability in gaze cueing in the normal population and of the fact that
prelesional data on gaze cueing are unlikely to be available, the use
of transcranial magnetic stimulation on healthy participants is a
more appropriate technique to be used if we are to achieve the goal
of delineating the neural basis of gaze cueing. Because participants
in this case can be screened for whether they show reliable gaze
cueing in the first place, areas such as the STS, inferior parietal
lobe, frontal eye fields, and other frontal areas could be investi-
gated.
Gaze Cueing in People With Autism-Spectrum Disorders
The individual differences in gaze and arrow cueing identified
by Bayliss et al. (2005) and Bayliss and Tipper (2005) have been
limited to normally developed young adult men and women. So,
how do adults and children with autism-spectrum disorders per-
form in simple gaze-cueing paradigms? Given the difficulties with
joint attention in autistic populations (Charman, 2003), one would
expect that such groups should show even weaker gaze and arrow
cueing than do normally developing male participants. However,
the heterogeneity of the autism-spectrum disorder population,
along with procedural differences, has led to a rather more equiv-
ocal picture. For example, Leekam et al. (1998) looked at re-
sponses to targets presented alongside a head-turn cue in children
with and without autism. They found that it was only the children
with autism and a low mental age who failed to use gaze direction
to shift their own attention. Relatively high-functioning children
with autism show similar gaze-following behavior as children
without autism. In computer-based tasks, comparable results have
been found. For example, children with autism at age 2 years
(Chawarska et al., 2003) and with high-functioning autism at age
10 years (Swettenham et al., 2003) appear to show cueing effects
with moving eyes that are similar to those of normally developing
children.
It is possible that the fact that the eyes moved in these three
studies, enabling more low-level analysis of the gaze cue (i.e., in
terms of motion, not gaze perception per se), had led all but the
most impaired participants (the low mental age children in the
autism group of Leekam et al.’s 1998 study) to show gaze cueing.
However, subsequent studies have confirmed cueing effects in
response to static gaze direction in children with high-functioning
autism (at around age 10 years; Kyllia¨inen & Hietanen, 2004;
Senju, Tojo, Dairoku, & Hasegawa, 2004). Such variations also
occur in older participants with autism. For example, Ristic et al.
(2005) found that nonpredictive gaze cues did not result in an
automatic shift of attention in their group of high-functioning
young adults with autism. On the other hand, another group of
high-functioning young adults with autism were able to use a
predictive gaze cue to shift attention voluntarily to a cued location.
So what can be concluded from these conflicting results? There
are several problems for interpretation. First, procedural differ-
ences between laboratories may account for some of the observed
differences. Gaze cueing is a relatively new procedure, and there is
no particular standard method that all researchers should use, but
factors like stimulus duration, cue–target SOA, task demands,
fatigue, and practice effects have not been investigated rigorously,
and these may differ in their influence in the autistic population.
Second, the heterogeneity of the autism spectrum makes it unlikely
that any two groups will perform in the same way, especially when
the procedures used are different. So, cueing effects and time
course differences between the groups may be distorted by main
effects of performance fluency. Nevertheless, what we can con-
clude is that under most circumstances (head turns, eye move-
ments, sudden onset of averted gaze), children with high-
functioning autism do reflexively shift their attention in the
direction of another person’s attention.
Regardless of the role of procedural factors in determining such
variations within the autistic population, it appears that gaze di-
rection cues attention differentially in people with autism com-
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pared with normally developing individuals. For example, in con-
trast to participants with autism, the use of gaze cues is much more
nuanced in typically developing samples. Participants without
autism show asymmetric cueing effects (Frischen & Tipper, 2006;
Okada, Sato, & Toichi, 2006; Vlamings, Stauder, van Son, &
Mottron, 2005), whereas people with autism orient to left and right
gaze cues equally (Vlamings et al., 2005). Further, differences
between people with autism and control participants are modulated
by target location expectancy (Senju et al., 2004). This is congru-
ent with additional findings from Senju et al. (2004), whereby
typically developing children showed differences in cueing be-
tween counterpredictive gaze and arrow cues, whereas children
with autism exhibited the same effects for both types of cues.
A final example of how gaze cues are used differently by
children with autism and by control participants comes from a
motor task used by Pierno, Mari, Glover, Georgiou, and Castiello
(2006). These authors found that control participants who observed
a model gazing at an object were quicker to initiate a reach to that
object than they were when the model gazed away. A similar effect
was found when the model had reached for the object previously.
However, neither action observation nor observation of gaze di-
rection influenced the performance of children with autism. The
authors suggest that the intentional aspect of gaze perception is not
internalized into the autistic children’s motor system in the same
way as in normally developing children (see also Jellema et al.,
2000). Taken together, these findings suggest that the system that
allows a gaze cue to shift attention in normal samples is at least
more flexible, has access to higher level processing, or is perhaps
even a different system to that which results in gaze cueing in
people with autism.
The above literature review also reveals a very interesting
developmental time course issue: Stronger gaze-cueing effects are
shown in the studies with younger children with autism. It is the
adult samples (Ristic et al., 2005; Vlamings et al., 2005) who
report atypical orienting. This observation is surprising, as one
would think that the use of compensation strategies would have led
to the improvement of the use of gaze in older people with autism
and, because of the delayed social development, that younger
children would show weaker effects. The converse appears to be
true: In spite of a developmental delay, children with autism at age
2 years and above show gaze cueing (Chawarska et al., 2003),
whereas adults show no gaze cueing (Ristic et al., 2005). Previ-
ously in this article, we have discussed the possibility that indi-
vidual differences in social attention may be due to the degree of
control an individual can exert over the gaze-following reflex
(Bayliss et al., 2005; S. V. Shepherd et al., 2006). This raises the
possibility that perhaps this age difference in gaze cueing in people
with autism is due to a development of voluntary control over joint
attention in autism, whereas normally developed adults retain a
more reflexive cueing response. Recall that Dalton et al. (2005)
reported greater amygdala activity in autistic individuals when
they attended to the eyes. This might account for the fact that
increased arousal is often reported when people with autism make
eye contact. One adaptive strategy to reduce the greater emotional
response triggered by eye gaze would be for individuals with
autism to learn to avoid looking at the eye region of other people.
Indeed, eye contact is often shunned by children with autism. This
avoidance could be driven by an inhibitory mechanism preventing
the person orienting to the eye region in the first place.
Such an avoidance strategy could potentially explain much of
the individual variation in gaze-cueing magnitudes in the normal
population (e.g. Bayliss et al., 2005) and could have critical
implications in autism. That is, a failure to orient covertly or
overtly to the eye region in the first place could account for
individual differences in gaze cueing. As noted before, Itier et al.
(2007) showed that averted gaze has a weaker effect on attention
if the eye region is not fixated. One would presume that if the eye
region is not fixated, then the quality of the gaze direction signal
would be weaker and, consequently, gaze cueing would be weaker.
Simply, how can you orient in the direction of gaze if the gaze-
cueing system has little information with which to compute the
appropriate direction? Future studies using careful analysis of gaze
fixation patterns, or manipulation of task instruction to lead par-
ticipants to attend to different parts of the face, may shed light on
individual differences in gaze cueing. A key question is whether
variations in the reflex to orient to the eye region can account for
differences in cueing or if the individual differences emerge from
variations in the gaze-cueing system itself.
Gaze Cueing and the Mechanisms of Visual Attention:
Looking Ahead
Observing another person’s gaze direction leads to shifts of
attention in the corresponding direction. What does this finding tell
us about attentional orienting? For decades, attention research has
been based on the assumption that two distinct types of orienting
are triggered by different types of cues: Peripheral sudden-onset
(exogenous) cues were assumed to trigger reflexive involuntary
orienting of attention, whereas central symbolic (endogenous) cues
were thought to induce nonreflexive voluntary shifts of attention.
With the introduction of gaze cues, this previously clear distinction
became suddenly blurred. Now there were centrally presented cues
that did not directly indicate a likely target location, and yet
automatic shifts of attention were consistently observed. As such,
gaze cueing resembles peripheral cueing in the following ways:
First, gaze-evoked cueing effects emerge rapidly even at short
SOAs (e.g., Friesen & Kingstone, 1998; Langton & Bruce, 1999).
Second, those cueing effects arise at short cue–target intervals
even if the cue is counterpredictive (e.g., Driver et al., 1999;
Friesen et al., 2004). Third, both types of cue elicit inhibition that
is evident at longer SOAs (Frischen et al., in press; Frischen &
Tipper, 2004). The fact that such automatic shifts of attention
could be triggered by centrally presented, nonpredictive cues has
led some researchers to suggest that eye gaze is a special atten-
tional cue because of its biological significance (e.g., Friesen &
Kingstone, 1998, 2003b; Langton & Bruce, 1999). However, fur-
ther investigations using arrow cues showed that they, too, can
induce rapid shifts of attention, even if they are uninformative with
regard to the likely target location (e.g., Hommel et al., 2001; M.
Shepherd et al., 1986; see also Soto-Faraco, Sinnett, Alsius, &
Kingstone, 2005, for similar findings with gaze and arrow cues in
tactile attention). This shows that biologically relevant (gaze) and
biologically irrelevant (arrow) central cues trigger very similar
attention shifts, which in turn resemble those elicited by peripheral
cues. Thus, eye gaze may not be as different from other types of
cues as previously suggested, at least in terms of their basic
behavioral effects. In particular, it seems that the old distinction
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between exogenous and endogenous orienting does not apply with
regard to different types of cues.
Unfortunately, research continues to focus on relabeling these
“new” cueing effects in terms of the already existing categories.
The questions that are often posed are the following: Is gaze
cueing exogenous or endogenous? And where does cueing by
arrows fit in? Validation for this kind of categorization is sought
by looking at the similarities between these types of cueing and
how they correspond to the old classification (see Lambert et al.,
2006, for a discussion on the difficulty of such categorization).
Specifically, given the aforementioned cueing patterns of gaze and
arrow cues, they are now commonly regarded as reflexive or
exogenous. However, it is imperative that the differences between
the effects evoked by various cues are taken into account, too.
Indeed, despite their broad resemblance, there are more subtle
differences between gaze, arrow, and peripheral cueing. For ex-
ample, the time course of gaze-evoked orienting effects differs
from that of peripheral cueing. Facilitation effects build up more
gradually in response to gaze cues than peripheral cues, and the
onset of IOR is relatively delayed (Frischen & Tipper, 2004).
Paradoxically, precisely the time course of gaze cueing has been
cited as evidence for exogenous-type orienting (Friesen & King-
stone, 1998), when in fact, one might argue that its time course
more closely resembles that of endogenous orienting (cf. Cheal &
Lyon, 1991). On the other hand, gaze cueing can be regarded as
reflexive in the sense that it cannot be suppressed. When the target
is more likely to appear in the uncued location (i.e., the cue is
counterpredictive), gaze cues nevertheless trigger attention shifts
in the gazed-at, but unpredicted, direction at short cue–target
intervals (Driver et al., 1999). The directional incentive of arrow
cues can easily be overridden so that orienting occurs to the
predicted location only (Friesen et al., 2004). It has therefore been
suggested that both gaze and arrow cueing are reflexive, but gaze
cueing is more strongly so.
At this point we should perhaps question the usefulness of
categorizing cueing effects in terms of existing labels. One must
keep in mind that those categories were defined on the basis of
specific patterns of responses that were, at the time, observed with
different types of cues. Does it therefore make sense to take new
effects and try to sort them into those groups? Is it not more fruitful
to further explore the boundary conditions and more closely ex-
amine the specific circumstances under which certain effects are
observed?
For example, it is becoming more and more apparent that basic
attention orienting is influenced by individual differences, such as
gender, autistic tendencies (Bayliss et al., 2005; Bayliss & Tipper,
2005), or anxiety (Mathews et al. 2003; Tipples, 2006). The fact
that normal male participants show different orienting styles in
simple cueing studies has implications for attention research. It
means that the early confusion over the differences between pe-
ripheral and symbolic control of attention may have been due in
part to sampling biases, with more male participants in experi-
ments with null effects and more female participants in experi-
ments with significant effects. Unfortunately, standard demo-
graphic information is often omitted from method sections in basic
attention studies, so it is unknown whether this factor truly con-
tributed to the conflicting results. Although it is likely that meth-
odological differences can explain much of the confusion (B. S.
Gibson & Bryant, 2005), the field still has some catching up to do
if these sex differences do indeed indicate basic differences in the
way that cues to attention are used by men and women. Clearly,
replication and extension of these sex differences with different
cueing paradigms are necessary.
With regard to inhibition effects, it appears that like facili-
tation cueing, IOR in response to peripheral cues is not affected
by gender (Bayliss et al., 2005). However, it is unknown
whether sex differences exist with IOR in response to gaze or
arrow cues. Given that gender differences in gaze cueing seem
to emerge primarily at later SOAs (e.g., 700 ms; Bayliss et al.,
2005), with women showing larger facilitation effects than
those of men at those intervals, it is possible that this factor
contributes to the delayed emergence of IOR with gaze cues.
Indeed, the samples in the Frischen and Tipper (2004) study
that demonstrated gaze-evoked IOR contained mainly female
participants. Therefore, it may be that this time course of cueing
is specific to women, but not to men, who might show an earlier
onset of inhibition effects. Taking into account individual dif-
ferences could help to resolve the confusion regarding similar-
ities and differences between different types of cueing.
It is also important to investigate the role of the context in which
orienting of attention occurs. As demonstrated by Bayliss and
Tipper (2005), gaze-cueing effects differ depending on the percep-
tual coherence of the target object. This is another demonstration
that the nature of the target processing demands can have profound
impacts on the way that attention is directed in a scene (Jordan &
Tipper, 1998). This issue is particularly pertinent for attention
researchers wishing to investigate the attentional control of social
orienting. The object of joint attention—that is, the stimulus that
both parties look at—is a vital element of a social attention
episode. Orienting to the correct object in the scene, rather than
toward any object or the general hemispace, is a defining feature
of the advancement from mere gaze following to joint attention in
infants (Emery, 2000). Furthermore, using gaze cues and object
interactions will enable researchers to investigate the intentional
aspect of gaze (Pelphrey et al., 2003; Pierno, Mari, et al., 2006).
That is, where people look indicates their likely next action be-
cause people tend to attend to their own actions, and we are
surprised when they act on an object other than the one at which
they are looking. Hence, although it has been all but ignored thus
far (but see Bayliss & Tipper, 2005; Friesen, Moore & Kingstone,
2005; Lobmaier et al., 2006), manipulations involving the target
object may well prove very promising in future work, if attention
researchers are truly interested in the nature and mechanisms of
social attention. Perhaps pursuing such lines of inquiry may prove
the gaze-cueing paradigm’s true worth to the study of the devel-
opment of flexibility in joint attention and hence unlock the
problems with joint attention associated with clinical populations
such as people with autism.
Gaze cueing is informative with regard to the neural architecture
of attention orienting and its origins. As already noted, stimulus-
driven and voluntary shifts of attention are subserved by different
though interacting neural circuits (e.g., Corbetta & Shulman, 2002;
Rosen et al., 1999). Some neuroimaging studies suggest that the
neural map activated by observing gaze direction more closely
resembles exogenous than endogenous orienting. Further, covert
shifts of attention show similar activation to that elicited by sac-
cadic eye movements (see Grosbras et al., 2005, for a meta-
analysis). This similarity between neural activation of eye move-
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ments, attention orienting, and gaze perception accords with the
finding that observing another person’s action activates a corre-
sponding motor program (see, e.g., Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti,
2004; Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004,
for reviews). That is, observation of a particular action elicits the
same patterns of activity in the premotor areas that are also
recruited when performing the action. This has been found for a
whole range of actions, from foot and arm movements to move-
ments of the mouth (Buccino et al., 2001). Besides premotor
cortex, a distributed network of brain areas interact in the human
mirror system, including temporal, parietal cortices, although the
basal ganglia and cerebellum may also have roles (Kessler et al.,
2006). It is reasonable to assume that a similar action/observation-
matching mechanism would also be engaged by observing eye
movements. Indeed, observing gaze triggers involuntary saccades
in the corresponding direction, lending support to the notion that
the observed action is mirrored (Mansfield et al., 2003; see also
Ricciardelli et al., 2002).
Could such mirror activation account for gaze cueing? Saccade
preparation and shifts of covert attention are closely linked. Cells
in the monkey SC show enhanced firing rates if a target that is to
be saccaded to is within their receptive fields, even prior to the
actual execution of an eye movement (Goldberg & Wurtz, 1972).
The SC contains both visual and oculomotor cells, suggesting that
stimulus-driven orienting and eye movements are coupled (Mohler
& Wurtz, 1976; Wurtz & Mohler, 1976). Another brain area that
contains both visual and oculomotor neurons is the frontal eye
field (FEF), which is also active during covert shifts of attention
and saccade preparation (e.g., Connolly, Goodale, Menon, & Mu-
noz, 2002; Gitelman et al., 1999; Schall, 1997). Finally, involve-
ment of the STS has been reported during covert shifts of attention,
gaze perception, and eye movements, and neurons in the STS
project directly to the FEF (e.g., Grosbras et al., 2005; Hooker et
al., 2003; Komatsu & Wurtz, 1989; Nobre, Gitelman, Dias, &
Mesulam, 2000; Schall, Morel, King, & Bullier, 2005). Such
findings are in congruence with the premotor theory of attention,
which holds that the preparation of goal-directed actions and
attention shifts are tightly linked (Rizzolatti, Riggio, & Sheliga,
1994; Rizzolatti, Riggio, Dascola, & Umilta`, 1987). That is, spatial
selective attention mechanisms are proposed to originate in neural
circuits that code visually guided movements in space in terms of
motor requirements. Assuming that observing another person’s
saccade activates a corresponding motor program, this mirror
system-evoked saccade preparation would thus result in an atten-
tion shift in the corresponding direction.
In line with the notion of a link between mirror system
activity and joint attention, it has been suggested that a dys-
functional mirror system may be a root cause in the develop-
ment of autism (Williams, Whiten, Suddendorf, & Perrett,
2001). Mirror neuron activity is thought to play a pivotal role
not only in action imitation but also in decoding the goal of the
action and, ultimately, understanding another person’s inten-
tions—all key elements in theory of mind, and precisely the
skills that are impaired in autism. Indeed, mirror system acti-
vation is markedly decreased in individuals with autism during
observation and imitation of movements of the lips and hands as
well as of emotional facial expressions (Dapretto et al., 2006;
Nishitani, Avikainen, & Hari, 2004; Oberman et al., 2005;
Theoret et al., 2005; see Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006, for a
review). Furthermore, mirror neuron activity is related to the
level of social functioning—the stronger the mirror activity, the
better the social skills (Dapretto et al., 2006). Whether mirror
system activity is also impaired in autistic individuals during
observation and imitation of gaze shifts remains to be estab-
lished. Some evidence points toward that possibility, as both
gaze following (Langdon et al., 2006) and mirror system activ-
ity (Quintana et al., 2001) appear to be overactive in people
with schizophrenia, which supports the notion of a functional
link between the two.
Koval, Thomas, and Everling (2005) reported evidence against
the mirror hypothesis of gaze orienting. By using a similar
saccade-target paradigm as Ricciardelli et al. (2002), they showed
that when antisaccades were required where participants have to
make a saccade toward the opposite side of a target stimulus,
observed gaze direction can be effectively ignored. Saccadic RTs
were actually shorter when the executed saccade was in the oppo-
site direction to the observed gaze compared with those when
performed gaze and observed gaze were congruent. However,
whereas both Mansfield et al. (2003) and Ricciardelli et al. pre-
sented the gazing face concurrently with the target, the face was no
longer present when the saccade target appeared in Koval et al.’s
study. It is possible that the evoked mirror activation is rather short
lived so that performance is more susceptible to task-dependent
top-down modulation when presentation of the observed action has
ceased. Indeed, as the authors themselves point out, it may be the
case that saccades are initially prepared in the direction of per-
ceived gaze but are then modified on the basis of current task
demands. Furthermore, during action observation, in addition to
premotor activation, corticospinal projections are modulated in an
inverse way so that the mirrored action does not interfere with
executed action (Baldissera, Cavallari, Craighero, & Fadiga,
2001). Such an action inhibition mechanism may be differentially
engaged depending on the task at hand. Koval et al.’s (2005)
finding once again demonstrated the importance of taking into
account contextual factors that impact gaze-cueing behavior.
The influence of inhibitory mechanisms in the perception of
other people’s actions may be a critical variable (Jonas et al.,
2007). As discussed above, inhibition of gaze signals emerge
slowly (Frischen & Tipper, 2004), perhaps more slowly than does
inhibition of action-imitative responses. This may suggest a subtle
and flexible role for inhibition of gaze cueing. Performing the
same action as another may often be socially inappropriate. (Imag-
ine you see someone reach for his glass: While you simulate what
you see, it would often violate social norms if you were to execute
the same action.) However, orienting to the direction of another’s
gaze is less costly and is usually beneficial. Therefore, although
the rapid inhibition of imitative actions may be a natural state of
the mirror system for observation of limb actions, a similar inhib-
itory system in gaze observation may be perhaps controlled by a
higher level system and hence may be computationally more
complex. Finally, one more difference between imitation of action
and imitation of gaze is that although one can observe one’s own
actions and their consequences, one can only see the consequences
of one’s own eye movements.
If a mirror neuron-type system is involved in gaze following,
then the FEF may be a candidate region. The FEF can be consid-
ered part of the premotor cortex, responsible for generating and
programming saccades. Hence, the gaze-matching system could be
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influenced by processes in this area and by interactions with STS.
In conclusion, gaze following is the result of an action observation/
action execution-matching system par excellence, but how similar
it is to the mirror neuron system is not clear.
It is possible that both gaze cueing and orienting of attention via
arrow cues have evolved from similar mirror system mechanisms.
Directional arrows may have emerged as schematic representa-
tions of gaze direction or pointing gestures, both of which are
coded in the STS. Of course, at present, such considerations
remain speculative because too little is known about the precise
role of the STS and other brain areas in orienting attention to gaze
and other symbolic cues, and even less is known about the neural
architecture of a mirror system for gaze. The STS is more strongly
activated during gaze cueing than arrow cueing, which is in line
with the behavioral observation that orienting of attention is “more
reflexive” in response to gaze cues than to arrows (Friesen et al.,
2004; Hooker et al., 2003). Could this be because gaze observation
directly activates the hypothetical mirror system, whereas arrow
cueing recruits only the attention orienting system that has evolved
from it? After all, gaze cues are biological stimuli that carry social
meaning, a dimension that arrow cues are lacking. Further studies
into the neural basis of gaze- and arrow-evoked attention shifts are
needed to clarify the role of the STS in each. Also, the contribution
of the FEF to gaze and arrow cueing remains unclear. Most
neuroimaging studies of gaze cueing have either focused on re-
gions of interest such as the STS, the fusiform face area, or the IPS,
or have used arrow cueing as a baseline against which to compare
gaze cueing. Perhaps both processes recruit similar neural circuits
to a greater extent than commonly assumed, which would make it
difficult to identify the underlying neural basis for each in a direct
comparison.
As a final note, the use of observed gaze direction to induce
attention shifts provides intriguing opportunities for attention
research. It is the sociobiological aspect of gaze cues that will
stimulate a myriad of research possibilities because interactions
between attention and social cognition can be directly investi-
gated. In this way, gaze cues introduce a new level of ecological
validity that has often been lacking in traditional cognitive
research (Kingstone, Smilek, Ristic, Friesen, & Eastwood,
2003). With the use of biologically relevant stimuli, findings
from laboratory research may be generalized back to the real-
life encounters that are being mimicked. Indeed, much of our
everyday behavior is intrinsically linked to social interactions
with other people. Using social cues such as gaze allows re-
searchers to investigate attention processes under much more
natural, yet controlled, conditions than those used in traditional
approaches. Observing another person’s behavior allows the
observer to decode and make inferences about a whole range of
mental states such as intentions, beliefs, and emotions. Aside
from ecological validity, the study of attention via the use of
gaze cues is a perfect opportunity to develop a multifaceted
approach to research questions surrounding the function of
visual attention. That is, the study of how attention serves other
processes such as social cognition (e.g., face perception, emo-
tional processing), and vice versa, can now be addressed in a
more profitable way than if restricted to using traditional arrow
cues. Hence, the study of gaze cues has facilitated the merging
of previously separate fields of psychology investigating cog-
nitive processes and social variables, respectively. Bridging the
gaps between different disciplines is perhaps one of the great
challenges faced by science, and only in overcoming this hurdle
can knowledge be truly advanced.
Concluding Remarks
The study of how we process other peoples’ eyes is a fascinating
topic which encompasses several realms of psychological, socio-
logical, anthropological, clinical, and neuroscientific investigation.
Taking its place alongside decades of research about the psycho-
physics of gaze perception and the influence of another’s gaze on
social perception and interactions, the gaze-cueing paradigm
promised much. Now, with a strong and expanding knowledge
base, the previously disparate fields of attentional cueing, social
psychology and social neuroscience can progress in a mutually
beneficial direction. Though there are some basic questions that do
require urgent attention (e.g., what is the specific role of the STS
in gaze following?), we are confident that the field will quickly
find elegant ways of addressing and overcoming such problems. If
gaze-cueing and related paradigms can contribute to our knowl-
edge about attention and social functioning as strongly as is hoped,
then substantial progress in the understanding of social functioning
in normal human interaction, in infancy, and in developmental
disorders (especially autism), will surely follow.
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